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

SISYPHUS **THE STATE OF OUR DISUNION**
CHARLOTTE FINKENTHAL **GREECE, TURKEY AND WAR**
ABIGAIL McCARTHY **OUR SEARCH FOR ROOTS**
GERALD WEALES **HORSE CHOLER**
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NEWS & VIEWS

USCC & the Canal

There's extremely favorable reaction in Panama to the U.S. Catholic Conference's statement urging Washington to negotiate a "new and just treaty" with Panama, one that recognizes "the fundamental rights of the people of Panama."

Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, head of Panama's military government, sent a personal letter to Archbishop Marcos McGrath of Panama thanking him for his efforts in explaining the Panamanian position to North Americans.

Panama-America, a leading daily, editorialized that "the statement is very much in tune with the worldwide trend of rejecting colonialist enclaves in developing nations."

A columnist in *Matutino*, another daily, called the statement "one of the most solid documents ever issued in defense of Panama's claims over the canal."

(The statement, released in February by the Administrative Board of the USCC, dealt primarily with the canal, and sought to place the matter within an overall context of international social justice; as the following: "For peace in the world, which can come only with justice in the world, it is essential that we citizens of the United States, including our elected representatives, approach the Panama Canal issue with the same moral sensitivity we would to issues of justice within our own society.")

In February, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger and Panama's Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack signed an agreement in principle that the treaty of 1903 dealing with the Panama Canal would be abrogated and that the idea of "perpetuity" of U.S. control would be eliminated.

Carlos Lopez Quevedo, a member of the Panamanian team on renegotiations, told a press conference recently that progress was being made towards a settlement, but that no completion date could be predicted.

He said that a number of U.S. troops would be allowed to remain in the Canal Zone, but stressed that Panama does not accept the legality of foreign military bases within its country.

The U.S. has 14 military bases in the Canal Zone.

Watergate, Yet

Watergate continues to raise its ugly head. . . .

A Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) program has charged that one of Henry Kissinger's top aides—Gen. Brent Scowcroft—was present at the March 21, 1973 meeting at which President Nixon discussed Watergate hush money with Ehrlichman, Dean and Haldeman, and assumed command of the coverup.

The program, "As it Happened," concluded that anyone present at the meeting was "well aware" of plans to pay E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate conspirator, $75,000 hush money.

It said that Scowcroft did not actively participate in the discussion, but it added that Scowcroft would certainly have reported the discussion back to Kissinger, his chief.

Scowcroft denied being present at the meeting.

The Money Bind

The money-pinch tightens on religious institutions and interests.

• Cranwell, the tony Jesuit prep school in Lenox, Mass., will close next September unless more than $1 million in cash and pledges is realized within three months. Cranwell is being hit by declining enrollment, rising maintenance costs, and an inability to retire debts from a building program of the late '60s.

• Dissolved is the Reinhold Niebuhr Award, launched in 1972 to honor persons whose contributions in the areas of social justice, public life or world affairs best exemplified the spirit of the theologian who taught at Union Theological Seminary. Recipients (Father Theodore Hesburgh, Willy Brandt, Cesar Chavez, *et al.*) received cash grants of $5,000. The crunch came when the sponsors failed to achieve foundation support.

• Down is Jewish giving. Rabbi Benjamin Brilliant of Pelham Parkway Jewish Center said that this year, for the first time, the center's "matzah fund"—the Passover fund for poor people—encountered budget problems. "We reflect the recession," he commented. "Where people used to give $3 to the fund, now it's $2. Where they gave $10, now it's $5."

French Seminarians

For the first time in 11 years, the number of aspirants to the priesthood in France has increased over the preceding year. There were 194 new aspirants in 1974, a jump of 43 from 1973. Between 1963 and 1973, there had been an 83 percent drop in the number of students for the priesthood.

Also, the number of those leaving before ordination decreased from 422 in 1973 to 205 in 1974.

Offsetting these gains are ordination figures. They continued to lessen: 170 in 1974 as against 219 in 1973.

French seminarians now train at formation centers (an updated version of the traditional seminary) or in formation groups, which are situated within a university, factory, or rural-worker environment. In 1974, 1,317 were enrolled in formation centers, 118 in university-formation groups, and 73 in worker-formation groups.

Odds and Ends

—How goes the ecology fight (*cont.*)? Recycled paper showed an increase of 8.4 percent during February, over January. This left the effort 35.3 percent behind 1974 levels.

—How goes the Bicentennial? Virginia officials recently reenacted Patrick Henry's "Give-me-liberty-or-give-me-death" speech at the Richmond Coliseum. They expected a crowd of 10,000; 4,000 showed.

—Never-stopped-'em-before Department: The only Catholic college in England and Wales, Corpus Christi in London, is closing. One factor, according to a church newspaper, is lack of teachers with theological knowledge.

—A young woman in pink and gold spangled tights balancing on a pole 20 feet above the high altar; a cheeky clown shouting encouragement to the priest; a sequined showgirl piling her cape of fluffy turquoise marabou on the altar as part of the offertory . . . that's the way it was Palm Sunday at Holy Trinity Roman Catholic Church in the nation's capital, 1975 A.D. Father James English arranged the liturgy according to the injunction in Matthew: "Unless you become like little children. . . ." He went out and signed up a circus troupe.

JOHN DEEDY

Vadillo, *Siempre*, Mexico

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CORRESPONDENCE

Black-White Boston

Bronx, N.Y.

To the Editors: I read with aggravated interest John C. Cort's article "Black and White in Boston" [Jan. 31]. Although much of his reportage is probably accurate—for I, too, have visited South Boston in an attempt to sort out matters there for myself and found the situation similar—he fails to delve beneath the surface coverage of select people and events. Like most accounts of the busing situation in Southie, his tends to present a condescending, condemning view of the lower-middle-class Irish Catholic population in the area while, at the same time, he takes the rather tiresome, worn-out position of the intellectual white liberal in offering chic sociological explanations for the roots of the Black community's problems. This is all very easy, very pat, and very unhelpful.

Mr. Cort quotes himself as asking a Southie resident the following: "Did you ever think that maybe one of the reasons for the crime and murder in Roxbury is that black people are rebelling against the discrimination and injustice of the past?" I suggest we all ask ourselves if South Boston is not rebelling against these very same things and that we consider the possibility that striking out against busing forced upon them from outside their community might be their only means of rebelling against the discrimination and injustices being served upon them in a rigid class society.

When our large cities erupted in awful violence during the sixties, we condemned the Black population for lawlessness, but offered them as a result of their bloody protests many, if ineffective and short-sighted, programs intended to improve their lot as human beings. Despite the success or failure of these attempts, they were constructive gestures undertaken in response to pleas for help, pleas in the form of fire, blood, looting, and destruction—the

(*Continued on page 92*)

NEWS & VIEWS: 66 **CORRESPONDENCE: 67**
EDITORIALS: 67
WASHINGTON REPORT: The State of Our Disunion: *Sisyphus* **68**
THE IMMANENT WAR: GREECE AND TURKEY: *Charlotte Finkenthal* **69**
OUR SEARCH FOR ROOTS; I: THE NEW ETHNICITY: *Abigail McCarthy* **71**
BEYOND STAGNATION: *Steven Philip Kramer* **72**
THE STAGE: *Gerald Weales* **78**
THE EDELIN DECISION: *Carol Altekruse Berger & Patrick F. Berger* **76**
THE SCREEN: *Colin L. Westerbeck, Jr.* **79**
BREAD AND RADICAL CHANGE: *Michael Moffitt* **80**
THE CORPORATION & EMPIRE ECONOMICS: *Kirkpatrick Sale* **85**
BOOKS: *Irving Malin, John Druska, Joe Nicholson, Jr., Jaroslav Pelikan* **90**
ILLUSTRATIONS: *Front cover: Liberation News Service; pages* **72** *and* **74:** *LNS Women's Graphics; pages* **86:** *Tony Jenkins/K-W Free Press/LNS*

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INVOLVEMENT'S LAST HOURS

The Indochina of American ordaining is gone. As this is written, Cambodia is all but lost, and South Vietnam's time seems extremely limited. The situation is an unmitigated disaster. A beautiful corner of the world is permanently scarred. Two cultures have been shattered. Hundreds of thousands have died needlessly or in vain, including 55,000 Americans. Tens of thousands stand in risk of reprisals for having come under the spell of the stranger from across the Pacific—who didn't belong there in the first place and who now retires, disgraced and a little humiliated, but supported ever by the ideological *macho* that motivated the misadventure. The recriminations are bitter, and well might they be.

There's a lot of blood on American hands, and it is not going to be washed away by grand gestures, like the parachuting of supplies to the last garrisons in Phnom Penh; by impractical, if not cynical, requests for $722 million in emergency aid for Saigon; or by the hurling of some last American bodies into the fray, as could result through a careless extension of presidential authority to use troops in Indochina. The U.S. is "out" of Indochina, or nearly so. If it is to be "in" again, it can only be on the basis of expansive humanitarianism.

In this context, President Ford's request of April 10 for $250 million for economic and humanitarian aid to South Vietnam is piddling. This amount cannot begin to finance relief and recovery, particularly if this aid is conceived—as it should be—in terms of *all* the Vietnamese people, and *all* the Cambodians. Communist victories do not relieve the U.S. of its substantial economic and humanitarian obligations to that part of the world; they only challenge the purity of American concepts. If it is people who are important, the American course should be clear.

Unfortunately, there is considerable ambiguity in the American ap-

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proaches to date. The airlift of the infants, for instance—however well-intentioned—smacked of cultural imperialism and, to the extent that Ambassador Graham Martin can be credited, of political opportunism. Dubious, too, is some of the talk concerning the evacuation of American loyalists. Safe passage and resettlement of threatened South Vietnamese are, of course, moral imperatives. But some of the figures mentioned—200,000, and perhaps as many as a million—seem unreal. Apart from enormous problems of logistics, there is the question of propriety. An indiscriminate and wholesale expatriation could touch off new panic, with God-knows what consequences; it could also sum to an indefensible depletion of the resource the country needs most in order to recover—its own people.

Let the U.S. proceed without delay in evacuating those whose lives are truly in danger from reprisals. But let it also work so that as many Vietnamese as possible can safely stay. The other day in Paris, Vietcong representatives assured an American delegation, which included Congressman Edward Pattison of Troy, N.Y., that the Communists were following a policy of "general amnesty," and that it applied even to those involved with the CIA and in the Phoenix program. The Communists' word very frequently is no better than our own, and cannot be accepted at face value. But this country can press for its honoring, through third parties —China and Russia most notably—and world agencies in positions of influence. It is perhaps the most urgent of immediate tasks.

WASHINGTON REPORT

THE STATE OF OUR DISUNION

Five-score and a dozen years ago, Lincoln took a train to Gettysburg. He traveled without the platoons of security men and squads of newsmen that mark the journeys of Presidents in the twentieth century.

His speech on the battlefield at Gettysburg was brief —270 words. It would have taken up only seven inches in a newspaper of today. Its brevity caught a photographer unaware and unable to snap his camera to record Lincoln's appearance.

But President Lincoln's brevity turned out to be the soul of wisdom—a haunting wisdom that endures beyond any photograph that would have been taken. Lincoln, that most gaunt and driven of Presidents, emphasized two needs:

- A need of the living to carry out the "unfinished work" of the nation; i.e., to place all Americans on an equal footing at the starting line.
- A need for "increased devotion" to that great cause—"that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the Earth."

His words were consistent with the exhortatory nature of addresses by the founding giants of the nation. Somewhat immodestly, Jefferson had suggested, "We are acting for all Mankind." Emerson, a contemporary of Lincoln, suggested that "the office of America is to liberate, to abolish king-craft, priest-craft, caste, monopoly, to pull down the gallows, to burn up the bloody statute book, to take in the immigrant, to open the doors of the sea and the fields of the Earth."

Lincoln, who lost his seat in the House of Representatives because of his opposition to our going to war with Mexico, knew there was no sure foundation set on blood.

The pacemakers of American democracy spread the humane and hopeful spirit that the nation was to live within. America was to be a place of friendly families and secure streets. An exceptional place inhabited by people freed from the fanaticisms, national rivalries and oppressions of Europe. And we have moved towards the goals set by these pacemakers.

But not without interruption from time to time. This is such a time. During the early 1970s we came close to having representative government snatched from us. The cheering has stopped under the onslaught of military adventurism, political assassination and a racial mess that will not evaporate. Democracy, we now understand, is not a vending machine stocked with good government, high confidence and creature comforts. The speaker was correct—democracy is a system that assures we are governed no better than we deserve. And, in truth, neither the governors nor the governed are doing well. And there exists no "safety valve"—the beckoning empty fertile lands of the West. These are occupied and there's no place to hide any more from our failings.

The Congress, particularly the House, is seeking to reestablish itself as a peer for a President, and at the same time, purge the presidency itself of Caesarism. But it will take grit and years to regain the lost high ground.

Gains painfully won by minority groups are not fully secured. Today, they struggle to hold their position on the slippery slope of a declining economy. Legislative poultices no longer work.

We find ourselves involved in a tremendous struggle between entrenched power and authority of flawed public and private institutions and the rights and privileges of harassed individuals. Within this situation lies the danger that we may seek to "escape from freedom."

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Freedom being the heaviest burden of all and in ominous times a call for "order" has appeal—Yeats' "slouched beast waiting to be born."

(Political liberals bear a responsibility in this regard. However admirable to work toward establishing minimum standards of existence and understand the impatience of those who do not yet enjoy such standards, it is wrong to extend this understanding to perpetrators of mindless violence, whether directed against halls of government, assemblies of learning or IBM. It is possible to insist on civil peace without being repressive.)

The President and the Congress need jointly to repair the country's foreign policy for the future, without recriminatory battling over the past and the accountability of those in the present for our defeat in Southeast Asia, which we almost bombed into oblivion as the Romans once salted over Carthage.

It's just plain, hard, dirty work in the boiler room.

There are no golden-ages to use as reference points. Nor can "great principles" get us through these times of troubles. Principles are hollow—they only become reliable and strong in the measure which we live by them.

Nor is there some immutable historical law of rise and fall of nations, as James Burnham and others would suggest. History is to be made—not leaned upon. History neither solves nor settles anything. History is to be made in the present—that's what we have to work with.

Whitehead said the present is holy ground . . . in the present is summed up the past—and in it, the future is implicit.

We are approaching our two-hundredth year as a nation, a brief instant among recorded events.

We can emphasize how far we have traveled—as well as how far we have to go. Amid much that is fraudulent in our mass society, there is still discernible idealism and the unfinished struggle for liberty for all.

Our intelligence suggests pessimism, but our will, optimism. We are wiser than we know.

Rosa Parks, the seamstress, wouldn't move from her seat on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama.

Dr. King had a dream.

Cesar Chavez organized the unorganized stoop-laborers in the California vineyards.

Ralph Nader didn't believe what he read on labels —what he was told was under the hood.

A secular definition of original sin might be that not only has each not done enough, each can never do enough. But, more encouraging, one can equally turn around the equation to read that one can not do everything, but one can do something.

Mrs. Parks and Dr. King and Cesar Chavez and Ralph Nader insisted on living with hope because they could not live with despair.

That should be our way, too. SISYPHUS

The Immanent War: Greece and Turkey

The recent invasion of Cyprus by Turkey presents a dangerous crisis, not only to the NATO alliance but also to the Mediterranean area. The dilemma facing United States' foreign policy is this: How can the United States retain friendly connections with both Greece and Turkey?

As the political and diplomatic experts see it, the United States withdrawal of military aid to Turkey, which the American Congress favored and President Ford opposed, will probably mean that Turkey will turn to the Soviet Union or China for support. This could result in the creation of a solid new bloc, consisting of Syria, Turkey and the USSR. Such a bloc would also mean the serious loss to the United States of a strategic seaway, since the Dardanelles is the bridge between Europe and Asia.

On the other hand, if the United States retains Turkey as an ally, Greece most certainly will be lost. Greece has already taken steps away from the United States—withdrawing her troops from Greece's NATO bases, for example, and forming new European alliances which will prompt Greek economic independence and full participation in the European community. Because of the continuing crisis in Cyprus, the situation is now so deteriorated it will be impossible for Greece and Turkey to avert war.

The horror stories of the more than 30,000 Cyprus refugees who have arrived in Greece, plus the recent cut-off in military aid to Turkey by the U.S. Congress, are factors pushing Greece and Turkey on their collision course. What is more, the Greeks are well aware of this confrontation and are preparing for it by purchasing weaponry. What is surprising is the obvious helplessness of even Henry Kissinger. He seems to be hoping for Turkish conciliation, but this does not seem likely. It is no wonder that the United States' foreign policy is stymied in this area. This particular crisis could mean a whole set of new alignments and the end of NATO. The Americans would prefer to keep the old allies intact, but the profound philosophy necessary for coping with this problem is not in evidence. Instead, American foreign policy is being handled in the pragmatic manner so characteristic of this nation. Thus, crises are handled on day-to-day or hour-to-hour basis, much as a business concern operates. Therefore, situations are viewed not as matters of principle but as matters of practical expediency.

The Department of State's fear of a Turkish-Soviet alliance is so great it paralyzes American action of any kind. Various experts on the area stress the need for

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choosing between Turkey and Greece, pointing to one or the other choice as the better. This is a three-way stalemate among Turkey, Greece and the United States. How can anyone win without another one or two losing?

For a serious appraisal of this situation, one is compelled to investigate the causes of Turkey's decision to retain what it has taken by conquest. For example, what are the internal conditions within Turkey? Why are they now claiming not only a disproportionate share of Cyprus but several other islands with Greek majorities on them, most notably Thasos, Chios and Rhodes? And after those, who knows what else? Perhaps Crete and more.

What is apparent now is that Turkey has embarked on an expansionist foreign policy, although this fact may not be evident to other nations. The Greeks, having recognized the signposts, are reacting with appropriate aggressiveness and are buying enormous quantities of weapons and planes in preparation for that inevitable day which must come.

The real tragedy of this coming war is that neither opponent can profit from it. Both economies are badly in need of development and peace, although the Greek economy is in much better condition. A closer look at their economies shows the Turkish posture toward Greece.

Shocking Facts of Life

The economic and social facts of life within Turkey are shocking in the extreme, even by Greek standards. More than 70 percent of Turkey's 38 million people live in rural areas and in great poverty. The per capita income is $300 a year, while the inflation rate is 25 percent. This situation exists together with a critical medical doctor shortage (2000 to 1); preventive medical programs are so lacking that tuberculosis and trachoma are endemic. With a literacy rate of 55 percent in a country where 66 percent of the population are under age 30, prospects for other than agrarian jobs are nil. About a half-million Turks have emigrated to unskilled jobs in European factories. The shantytowns *(gecekondu)* on the outskirts of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir are homes for many of the populations of those cities. In a developing country, which has not been ravaged by war for more than 50 years and has enormously fertile land and other natural resources (minerals and port facilities), these conditions are worse than one expects, especially since there is a plentiful labor supply. Why does Turkey have a GNP of only 8 billion dollars a year?

What accounts for the disappointment in the progress of the Turkish economy is the post-Ataturk structure that lingers mainly as a hindrance in the form of ideological baggage. The main causes are the following: 1) the landowning and monied classes are still dominant (by the 1970 census, a mere 491 families owned in excess of 1200 acres each) and work for self-interest, and 2) a socialistic substructure operates in a regressive manner. This can be seen in the way the State controls and discourages investments. For example, the State banks (Central Bank, Agricultural Bank and others) control proposed projects and investments. The State monopolies of cigarettes, tea, spirits and newsprint are perhaps less inhibiting simply because these industries do not require large capital investments and industrialization. State control has, however, inhibited one essential industry—mineral deposit excavation, refinement and use or export. Internal political pressures have discouraged domestic and foreign investments of capital. Industrialization is not proceeding well enough to prevent large imports of essentials, and this throws the economy off badly.

These two major factors have retarded Turkey's progress and have made necessary the cultivation and sale of the poppy as a much-needed source of export income.

The Turkish economy is in a shambles. The lack of qualified inspectors has resulted in widespread evasion of taxes by those whose earnings warrant taxation. This, in turn, produces heavier indirect taxation in the form of sales and excise taxes, which negatively affect the common man's purchasing power. Turkey's balance of payments problems led in the later 1960s to a devaluation of the lira and to the adoption of austerity measures in August 1970.

Turkey's excellent port facilities are under-used, with a merchant fleet of only 714,000 gross tons in 1971. And although Turkey has the best developed road and rail network in the Middle East, the general lack of industry has not purposefully tapped it. By 1967, only 3 percent of the population used the available hydroelectric power, while most people used wood, dried dung, hard coal and lignite.

Not the least in importance is the growing fear by Turkey's military caste—the real decision-makers—which feels itself threatened by a closing circle that manifests itself in a growing majority movement of have-nots. This realistic presence has led to an obvious supranationalism in foreign policy, the likely target being an external enemy, namely Greece. Greece, by way of Cyprus and other islands, becomes the inevitable scapegoat. The swollen Turkish army would have a use, and the riches gained by conquest of lucrative islands would postpone the Turkish economic collapse. (Cyprus was rich enough to have enjoyed a higher standard of living than Greece.) Thus, Greece with her puny population of 9 million and limited military manpower and weaponry must face a grim future. There is, however, always the possibility of an upset in the mismatch, and Greece may surprise everyone by winning. But that would come only after great cost to both Turkey and Greece.

CHARLOTTE FINKENTHAL

(Charlotte Finkenthal, a member of the faculty of Baruch College, The City University of New York, recently returned from Greece.)

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OUR SEARCH FOR ROOTS
I: THE NEW ETHNICITY

ABIGAIL McCARTHY

I puzzle over the new ethnicity. It is, I know, a search for roots. "To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul," wrote Simone Weil. Spiritually, we Americans are in much the same plight as were the French in 1943 when she wrote *The Need for Roots*. She had been asked by the Free French in London to write a memorandum suggesting how the regeneration of their defeated country might be brought about. She spent the early months of that year writing, and in August of that year died, still an exile—partly because she refused to take more food than the official rations of ordinary people in her occupied country. She was thirty-three.

The Need for Roots is the last passionate statement, an appeal really, of an extraordinary human being to her own country and to humanity. "By now, Simone Weil has become a legend," said the reviewer for *The New Yorker* when the book was published in English in 1952, "and her writings are regarded as a classic document of our period.'" But perhaps it is necessary today, so many years later, to remind ourselves just who this legendary young woman was, whose "soul was incomparably greater than her genius," as T. S. Eliot reminds us in the preface. She was a philosopher, he acknowledges, whose social and political thought had reached a remarkable maturity. But she wrestled with tremendous problems.

"Simone Weil was three things in the highest degree: French, Jewish, and Christian." She saw clearly the faults and spiritual weakness of France. A devoted believer in Christ, she refused baptism. "Intensely Jewish, suffering torments in the affliction of the Jews in Germany," she could still fault the history of her people, Israel. "And in her political thinking she appears as a stern critic of both Right and Left; at the same time more truly a lover of order and hierarchy than most of those who call themselves Conservative, and more truly a lover of the people than most of those who called themselves Socialist."

In other words, Simone Weil was herself a living example of how complicated our roots can be. And she held that rootedness was most difficult to define. "A human being," she wrote, "has roots by virtue of his real, active, and natural participation in the life of a community, which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and *certain particular expectations for the future. This participation is a natural one, in the sense that it is automatically brought about by place, conditions of birth, profession, and social surroundings." "Every human being needs to have multiple roots.* It is necessary for him to draw well-nigh the whole of his moral, intellectual, and spiritual life by way of the environment of which he forms a natural part." (Italics mine).

Rootedness, then, depends on an attitude toward the future as well as an affirmation of the past. And only the *living* past is worth recovering These are the criteria she gives us for evaluating our own current search. What then is our search? We hope to root the uprooted. Is the new ethnicity the right path or a byway? As a development it followed so close on the heels of the black power movement as to be certainly both reaction and imitation. It is at once a remedy for alienation and the politicization of the powerless. It is allied with the struggle of the native and immigrant Spanish-speaking for justice, and, in some sense, encompasses the reassertion of the claims of the American Indians to their rights. Its critics have assailed it as artificial —a search for a new constituency by former civil rights leaders—and as an unhistorical effort to create a bond among the disaffected in our society. One such critic, Justus George Lawler, has written:

"Anyone with a sense of history who scrutinizes critically the current preoccupation with ethnicity can only be dumbfounded at the peculiarly rebarbative examples of national or ethnic traits that have been dredged up from the cloaca of prejudice and racist mythology. So witlessly have the new ethnicists embraced the slurs of the oppressive culture that Blacks are now supposed to feel they are witnessing to negritude by speaking a dialect compounded equally of the speech patterns of earlier servitude and of present deprivation; Latins, to their ethnicity by acting passionate, irrational, and lachrymose; Irish, bibulous, credulous, and uxorious; Slavs, gutsy, lusty, and liberated from deodorants—and so it goes." . . . "Blood is a dangerous bond to invoke; it arouses the feral gods; moreover, its streams get diluted and tangled. . . . But a spiritual and intellectual heritage, like faith, comes *ex auditu*; comes from literary and cultural transmission through family and milieu."

Intemperate, perhaps, but thought-provoking. As we have seen above, Simone Weil did not think of national origin as the first source of roots, since she thought of the nation as a recent historical phenomenon and each people is the result of successive waves of conquest. The French were once Bretons, Normans, Burgundians, Provencals, people of separate cultures and tongues. The English language, as both Scott and Shakespeare remind us, is compounded of Saxon and Nor-

(Continued on page 91)

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BEYOND STAGNATION

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

Advanced technology does not call for a nation of machine-tenders and clerks

It is not all that surprising that economists find it difficult to understand the nature of the present recession. This recession is not just a periodic downturn in the business cycle which can be alleviated through judicious fiscal manipulation. It is related to fundamental and underlying problems.

Less than two hundred years ago, the Industrial Revolution—perhaps the first basic change in economic history since men began to farm—destroyed the fabric of traditional society. The era of mass production and of the democratic revolution had begun. Is it possible that the confusion of our own epoch parallels that of two centuries ago, that we too are moving into a new historical epoch without quite knowing where we are going? The 19th century had its prophets of modernization, Marx and St. Simon for example, who saw in the barely emergent factory system the germ of full-blown industrial society. Their theories were far in advance of the concrete realities around them. Today, the facts have outrun the theories.

The inability of economists to evolve solutions which work—the fact that their formulas for solving unemployment and inflation are mutually exclusive—would seem less astonishing if we recognized that this is not the first time that conventional economic wisdom has proven useless. At the time of the Great Depression, the best economists supported deflationary governmental programs, so that the crisis would touch bottom. In doing so, they were adhering to the orthodox theories of classical liberal economics, which virtually equated the laws of the free market with natural law. Strangely enough, even many European socialists, sworn enemies of the capitalist system, shared the tenets of laissez-faire. Within a capitalist system, they proclaimed, there was nothing to do but to allow the laws of the market to reestablish equilibrium.

Fortunately, in this country Franklin D. Roosevelt made the political decision that such a program was unacceptable. He began to search, almost by trial and error, for new methods to reduce the social cost of the crisis and to get the economy back on the track. Out of his methods, and the theories of Keynes, emerged the theory and practice of the "welfare state," which has become the new orthodoxy. In other countries, the results were less fortunate. For want of an alternative program, the German center and left were powerless to stop the rise of Hitler, who drew support both from established but threatened elites and a mass of confused and disoriented people, what Hannah Arendt calls the alliance of "Capital and the Mob." The result was Nazism for Germany, five years of total war for the world.

If the economists of the 1920s were blinded by an almost religious faith in the self-regulating market, a totally ahistorical perspective which ruled out the possibility of a transformation of the system as a whole, our postwar economists are in a similar position. They too take for granted the continuation of the new system, and tend to think in merely one-dimensional terms. This, of course, doesn't help when the system is in the process of disintegration. Now suddenly they discover that they no longer possess the levers of control over the economy. Thence, their confusion—and ours.

It may well be that the present crisis will not become a full depression. However inconsequential the Ford proposals may be, a restoration of confidence and a

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resumption of consumer spending may avert immediate disaster. But even if they do "succeed," they will not eliminate the need to deal with the basic problems of political-economy which have provoked this crisis, will provoke others, and which will make prosperity an illusion until they are solved. But there is no reason to think that the Ford program will work, nor that the present alternatives suggested will work either.

The Chances

On the one hand, the result of the cheap money pumped into the economy—through tax reductions and rebates, easy access to credits from the Federal Reserve, or rapid shrinkage of interest rates—might be total failure. This will certainly be the case if "normal" corporative investment doesn't take place. In that case, governmental deficits on all levels might become disastrous. Inflation could rise beyond control. Public debt will threaten to become public bankruptcy. Savings will be destroyed. Politically speaking, the Democratic party, blamed for this cycle, might be buried under an avalanche of denunciations.

On the other hand, additional taxes on petroleum products would make sense only if the money acquired were channeled towards the development of new energy sources. Experience, however, would show that subsidies, tariffs, and depletion allowances have not led to such development, nor have they encouraged the corporations to seek substitute forms of energy. In the short run, at least, profits from crude oil and natural gas are more enticing. The corporations know that new tariffs won't cut their profits or lessen dependence on foreign oil. And since foreign oil is a source of super-profits, it is preferable to domestic investment involving much greater capital expenditures than the oil companies are willing to make. The ramifications of this situation are no secret. But there is virtually no public discussion of the solution, which entails effective controls or if necessary, nationalization. Indeed, what are the limits of governmental power over multinational corporations, corporations that constitute not only vertical but horizontal monopolies?

Another illuminating example of the current crisis of the American economy is the automobile industry. The automobile industry, which originated the assembly-line and thereby helped thrust America into world power, symbolizes the past and present of American industry. No industry has better known how to create demand through advertising. Yet at the same time, the technological level of the auto has barely changed in forty years. Consumption is encouraged by advertising and necessitated by built-in obsolescence. The industry is a prime example of monopoly capitalism: it has had the power to maintain high and uncompetitive prices and and to exercise enough political clout to head off changes desired by government or public opinion. In this struggle, it has often had the support of labor—and it is the head of the UAW who now defends the policy of not reducing prices to stimulate demand. (It is hard to see what cheap money or increased taxes will accomplish if corporate pricing behavior is not affected.) The automobile industry has come to represent conspicuous consumption, the throw-away ethic and status-seeking. It presupposed unlimited resources to waste, plenty of easy credit, a constantly rising demand and an environment always available to be sacrificed. Now the situation has changed. Facing unemployment or the fear of it, people are reluctant to buy cars. In a sense, this reluctance is profoundly *rational*: it might presage a rejection of consumerism in its worst sense. It might imply development of rapid transit, the conservation of the environment, the salvation of our scarred cities. And yet, this rationality threatens ruin for the auto industry and ruin for the economy as a whole, which can only function through irrational consumption and expenditures.

A similar situation exists in the defense industries. Wasteful defense spending coupled with the Vietnam war was instrumental in creating the inflation we suffer from today. Moreover, defense spending has resulted in a shortage of capital for more productive investment. Thus, other countries, like West Germany, may actually be able to invest more in capital improvement than the United States. When old Adam Smith wrote the *Wealth of Nations*, he argued that each individual pursuing his self-interest would in fact be acting for the interest of society as a whole. Now we observe the paradox that unless consumer and government behave wastefully and irrationally, the whole economic edifice may collapse on our heads!

Not only is wasteful use of resources expected, but so is wasteful use of human resources. It is as if we have too much talent and ability, too many qualified people. Social services, once instrumental for equipping men for jobs, now seem instrumental for keeping men off the job market. Even before it was generally realized that the country was in a recession, there were millions of people on welfare and hundreds of thousands of college graduates and M.A.'s and Ph.D's reduced to competing with the poor for the lowest paying jobs.

When an economy is based on waste of both men and resources, the rhetoric of efficiency, of sacrifice, of "biting the bullet" sounds hollow. It is impossible to appeal to the old virtues of sacrifice, frugality and hard work when these values, once part of the process of economic development, are now counter-productive to the whole system, which is geared to waste. And it is carrying hypocrisy too far when Roy Ash, sometime head of Litton Industries (a conglomerate of the most dubious sort) prates about the need to avert social security increases lest we go "socialist" in the year 2000!

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It seems to be expected that the government will finance waste, guarantee defense profits, support bankrupt railroads in their continual drift towards greater bankruptcy and maintain an increasingly large population of unemployed and unemployables. Yet it seems unthinkable that the government should take steps to take the situation in hand, by threatening the existence of a system which simply doesn't work. It is amazing that a government so powerful when it comes to international affairs dares do so little in its own backyard.

The real question today is whether the Democratic party, in particular the liberal Democrats, will be able to offer a real alternative. At a time of economic crisis, it is extremely important that the congressional opposition seem more than Tweedledum to the presidential Tweedledee. There is no reason to expect that the relative passivity of the American public during the years of the Great Depression would be repeated. People will no longer blame themselves for being unemployed. The public has come to believe that the government will not only maintain existing standards of living, but will guarantee social mobility. Failure on the part of the government will make the public listen to fascistic appeals. The feelings of anger against a system that had failed led millions of Germans to flock to Hitler (but it was not only Germans and not only Hitler).

Fascism involved the ability of a charismatic leader to get support from both members of the established but threatened elites and confused, anomic masses, who took the leaders' claims to be anti-establishment at face value. This was facilitated by the failure of the old opposition to provide a way out of the crisis. Fascism was thus able to equate the opposition and the establishment, and claim to be both anti-leftist and revolutionary at the same time.

We who have lived through the deep polarization produced by the Vietnam war should be able to see how easily demagogues can equate both the system and its liberal opponents (the "Liberal Establishment" or "Eastern Establishment" argument). And yet Vietnam was only a political and moral crisis. One dreads to think of what might happen in a full-scale economic crisis. It is unnecessary to try to predict what issues a demagogue might seize upon. Demagogues naturally exploit existing social cleavages aggravated by economic disintegration. These epiphenomena are then suffused with all the emotional intensity of the economic crisis, but are peripheral enough so that the demagogue is not forced to take a position on the real issue, with which he cannot deal.

An example of a potentially explosive issue is that of busing. Is it imaginable that the intensity of the Boston conflict is unrelated to the increasing unemployment and concomitant status anxiety among the lower-middle-class Irish? Likewise, the textbook controversy in West Virginia. The rising crime rate could also become a focus of attention. Historians are aware that crime is often an anarchic form of revolt by oppressed and politically immature groups, who are unable to act as a group. A depression producing an accelerated crime rate would also produce an accelerated demand for law and order—which could easily be converted into the ideology of repression.

Of course, it is possible that there will be no depression. But if not now, then later. Underlying problems don't go away unless we make them go away. We're better off facing them now. If the administration is incapable of providing answers, then the future of democratic government in this country requires that the liberal congressional opposition develop an all-embracing program of what should be done, of what America should become. It must channel national energies towards real change consistent with democratic ideals. It is impossible to exaggerate the danger to freedom in this country if neither the administration nor the Democratic congressional opposition provides such a program, if both major parties are identified with an economic system that does not work.

It is essential to take the extreme position that the survival of political democracy is no longer consistent



with the continuation of the free market system—or what is left of it, since the free market has lost all meaning and has become a mere slogan. The terms freedom and free market have long been intertwined in American consciousness. They have common origins. The revolt against feudalism in the 18th century involved both freedom for the individual entrepreneur against guild and mercantilist restrictions and freedom of thought, conscience and political action. But whereas freedom remains the very basis of our philosophy, the free market has lost its former role. The free market of Adam Smith is only a dream. The days of competition are largely over. This wouldn't be so bad if it weren't for the hard fact that the American economy has ceased being productive. It has been corrupted by the easy profits of the cold war and Vietnam, by an assured home market and federal support. It has lived off its undoubted technological superiority of 1945. That unchallenged superiority has vanished.

The full development of the most advanced forms of the New Technology have been impeded. Automation has not replaced the assembly-line. Profit-taking and speculation have tended to offset investment, and too many companies live off the State without being controlled by the State. The possibility of modernization has run up against the opposition of unions, which must

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fight vigorously to maintain obsolete jobs. (To be sure, the situation does not yet approximate that of England, which seems headed for disaster.) Every great breakthrough in technology requires a massive redistribution of the working population and of national resources. The Industrial Revolution brutally destroyed the peasantry and artisans of 18th century Europe. We cannot and should not accept such consequences today. Nor can we abandon the need for rapid technological change, unless the U.S. is prepared to sink towards obscurity. We must face the need for transformation in a coherent, national way. The choice is now between the myth of free enterprise and the reality of freedom.

The under-utilization of our productive forces stands in stark contrast with the developmental needs of America and of the world. Without a clear sense of direction, without a clear program, without a new sense of a historic mission, this country cannot gather together its enormous strength. America believed in its unique productive potential a century ago when it invented the assembly-line and sent railroads across a continent, and yet now it seems unable to deal with relatively minor problems. Vietnam and Watergate may have cast doubts on some values (and rightly so) but a new set of values, a new mystique which might integrate the nation has not yet arisen.

Individual work can have no purpose when it is not seen as part of a great collective project. Men must feel that by their actions they are making history. Today, in the post-industrial world, economic development cannot take place without human development. Advanced technology does not call for a nation of machine-tenders and clerks but a nation of professionals and technicians. This nation can once again become the motor force of world-historic change provided it can find its own motor force. Private enterprise once provided that force. It does not, it cannot do so now. We cannot return to a competitive system, because history doesn't move backwards. The economy is too big, too complex, the problems too important to be solved except by a powerful State in the service of the Nation.

If it is true that the underlying problems of the economy must be solved, it makes all the difference in the world whether this solution is brought about in a genuine and generous way by the mobilization of the nation for a high goal, or whether the "solution" is attempted through manipulation and repression. Watergate has shown how certain practices we have used abroad have come home to haunt us. The Watergate mentality provides a key to a potential "solution" of our problems along totalitarian lines.

The American public is less sophisticated about economic issues than about political issues. Its anxieties concerning the economy tend to be free-floating rather than highly directed. Thus, no program worthy of the name will emerge from perusal of a Gallup poll. The task of the liberal Democrats is to develop a program capable of resolving fundamental issues, and to use the Congress as an instrument for educating the public. The coming together of real leadership and public concern will bring about the momentum necessary to transform and to create.

The following action program offers some first steps intended to put the country back on course. In the end, rational development of resources on a national global level, the emergence of a new technology which can restore a sense of meaning to work and make possible the fulfillment of America's historic role: the development of the undeveloped world for the benefit of both America and everyone else—these are surely goals which can give sense and direction to the American nation.

1. The development of an effective system of national economic planning, with real controls.

2. All tax subsidies, allowances, credits, etc. should be tightly controlled. Following the European example, funds of investment credits and tax allowances should be deposited in special accounts which can be closely watched. Congress would set up a watchdog committee to see that such funds are used exclusively for the purposes to which Congress gives highest priority. In particular, investment for environmental purposes and rational use of energy should be promoted.

3. Control of utilities not only with respect to price but also in terms of the search for alternative energy exploration through the funds derived from tax exemptions, etc.

4. A strict limitation on expenditures by corporations, particularly in the energy field, outside this country.

5. Nationalization of industries of vital importance which cannot be run by private business (e.g. railroads).

6. Price controls, where the possibility of competitive pricing is illusory.

7. Development of an effective program of control over multi-national corporations through a program of international negotiations (especially with our European allies).

8. An attempt by Congress to establish a coherent and integrated foreign policy. The level of defense spending and foreign aid must be based on such a comprehensive survey.

9. The development of human resources and the elimination of the fear of technological unemployment through the creation of a fund to support workers who lose jobs through technological unemployment and a priority program of job training.

10. Assumption of federal responsibility for welfare, health insurance, and basic social services beyond the capability of local government or the individual.

11. Development of participation by workers in their enterprises. Workers in an advanced economy will not function to their full unless they gain some real control over their work.

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THE EDELIN DECISION

CAROL ALTEKRUSE BERGER & PATRICK F. BERGER

A new landmark in a no-man's land

The manslaughter verdict rendered against Dr. Kenneth Edelin by a Boston jury in the death of a 20- to 24-week old black male fetus was surprising on several counts. First of all, conflicting testimony and honest differences of professional opinion rendered the evidence less than absolutely conclusive. Secondly, the judge's instructions to the jury all but mandated a "not guilty" verdict, and the subsequent imposition of the most minimal sentence possible made it clear where the judge's sentiments lay. Finally, and most significantly, it appears that the doctor did nothing which exceeded the bounds of accepted medical practice in cases of this sort. So why did the jury insist upon imperiling the man's career by returning a verdict of guilty? If in the course of performing a legal abortion by hysterotomy (a procedure closely resembling the better publicized Caesarean sectioning of a full-term child), the doctor took steps to prevent spontaneous respiration on the part of the unwanted fetus, wherein lies the malfeasance?

Some of the jury members might have been impressed with the prosecution's contention that the right to abortion means only the termination of the pregnancy and does not necessarily imply the death of the fetus—and that therefore, Dr. Edelin had a legal and moral obligation to keep the fetus alive. Yet if ever there was an instance of hairsplitting, surely this would be it. The whole point of an abortion is to assure that a given pregnancy does not produce a living offspring. This is true of every abortion, simply by definition, regardless of the underlying motivation on the part of the woman who seeks it. When a late-stage abortion results in the delivery of a living child with a long-shot chance at ultimate survival, the situation is, at best, embarrassing. At its worst, it leaves the doctor in a limbo zone, with no clear-cut guides regarding his obligation (or lack of it) to his new "patient," if indeed the aborted fetus qualifies as a patient/person at all.

The jury in Boston was left to determine what the Supreme Court itself elected to consign to the realm of the unanswerable: "When does human life begin?" Pro-abortion forces have consistently maintained that there is no way to determine when human life begins, and that in the absence of a definitive proof of human personhood in the fetus, the presumption must be made that the product of conception is simply extraneous tissue until such time as it becomes "viable." Frankly, it is a source of wonder that so many otherwise fairly rational people have found counsel and sustainment in such a position. First of all, it must be conceded that there are two ways to go from the premise that one cannot determine the exact moment of an organism's emergency into a human existence. If one cannot be sure that the fetus *is* human, one must be equally unsure that it is not. And it seems entirely reasonable that in the presence of doubt, one ought to exercise extreme caution. If there is no way that I can determine whether the area into which I propose shooting a rifle is free of human traffic (although there is at least a 50-50 chance that it is) then common sense dictates that I refrain from shooting. Pro-abortion theory unaccountably chooses to draw the opposite conclusion, when it lobbies for abortion under circumstances which do not represent a clear threat to the life of the mother.

Secondly, the whole question of "viability" is extremely ambiguous. Technically speaking, "viability" refers to the ability of the fetus to live independently of its mother, supposedly after 24-28 weeks of gestation. In theory, it is at best a fairly arbitrary determination of the beginning of human life. In practice, "viability" is almost as elusive a quality as "humanity." With the advent of the artificial womb and growing talk of test-tube babies, we may well be entering an era in which the product of conception can be brought to maturity independent of the mother, even if it is aborted at an extremely early stage—provided those into whose care the aborted fetus falls are willing to employ all of the sophisticated techniques at their disposal to save it. And even after normal, full-term parturition, human infants are scarcely capable of survival independent of a mother or mother-substitute who assumes the responsibility of feeding, clothing and protecting it.

In fact, it was reported that during the Edelin trial, one doctor, testifying for the defense, expressed the opinion that viability occurs only after the child is discharged from the hospital. Ludicrous, yes. But from a medical point of view, there are numerous adult human beings (proof: they hold jobs, vote, raise children, *etc.*) whose very existence depends upon the availability of maintenance drugs and therapies such as insulin. As

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such, these people are not "viable" independent of an increasingly complex health-delivery system.

What all this points to is the absurdity of trying to define humanity under the essentially faulty guidelines set up by the Supreme Court. In essence, the Court has said that there is a point in time, prior to which the developing organism is non-human or perhaps pre-human, and after which it is suddenly invested with humanity and all the rights and privileges attendant thereon. But having posited the existence of such a point in time, the Court goes on to say that it cannot be determined when that point occurs. Given those two premises, is it any wonder that the fine art of legalistic haggling seems destined to be carried to new and greater heights? In the Edelin case, for instance, a substantial part of the controversy surrounded the precise meaning of the expression "to be born." In the course of the hysterotomy under contention, Dr. Edelin reportedly detached the infant from the maternal support system (the prosecution's definition of "birth") but deliberately refrained from removing the child from the uterine cavity (the definition of birth preferred by the defense) for a sufficient period of time that there would be no possibility of spontaneous respiration. According to one side, the child was "born," therefore human; according to the other, it was not.

If the above haggling is confusing to even the trained ethical and legal mind, why then, did the jury so facilely find Dr. Edelin guilty? The answer, it seems, lies in the photographs. The jury was shown pictures of a fetus at the 20-24 week stage, and to them, it looked like a very human baby, in other words, a person. If it was a human being, the conclusion was inescapable in the moral and philosophic terms as understood in the broad spectrum of Western ethics; the fetus must have "some" rights. And so, Dr. Edelin was found guilty, even if legally, he may not have been.

The more fundamental question that now has to be asked is whether "that which has been conceived by human beings is human." Once fertilization has taken place, the unique genetic code has been set. And the end result of this process that has begun is a human being, not a monkey or rabbit or Yahoo, but a human being. Pro-abortionists will argue that such a speck cannot that early in the process be human because it does not have personhood, especially as described by the eminent medical ethician, Joseph Fletcher. According to Fletcher, a person must be able to relate, to think and to be socially visible. If so, and such a criterion is adopted for personhood, then what about those who exist outside the womb but who do not relate to society: the idiot, the schizophrenic, the socially maladjusted? They too would lose their personhood status. As for visibility as a norm for humanhood, we only have to remember that just such a principle was used to deny personhood to various minority groups throughout history. The black, for instance, was segregated totally, and thus was not visible and certainly had no rights, either in the legal or the human sense, as evidenced by the scathing indictment in the literary masterpiece of Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man.*

What then is a human being? When does human life begin? When does a genetic code becomes a person? The only answer must be is "that which has been conceived by human beings is human," and those who cannot speak for themselves deserve more protection under the law than those who can lobby and make loud noises for their personal interest groups.

Does such a conclusion mean that abortions are immoral and thus illegal? Perhaps not, unless one is a total and complete pacifist. But some severe adjustments will have to be made by both sides. On the one hand, pro-abortionists may have to concede that the fetus is human and therefore has some rights, just as the mother has some rights. In addition, to raise emotional arguments about battered babies or unwanted children, as pro-abortionists do, is to beg the question. For such an unfortunate situation still does not take precedence over whether the fetus has any right to life. On the other hand, anti-abortionist forces may finally be forced to deal with the problem of the unwanted child and turn their energies to the protection and education of those children and not just the fetus. At the other end of the spectrum, what anti-abortionist forces may have to concede is that there may be cases where abortion is the lesser of two evils, especially where there is definite danger to the mother (rare nowadays) or where severe damage has occurred to the fetus because of an accident, such as an automobile crash or a harmful reaction to a drug. For even aspirin can be harmful to a fetus.

Absolute Stands

Perhaps the problem of the all-or-nothing approach which both camps seem to display lies in our general reaction to difficult moral issues. Edelin's statement after the trial that he felt no guilt either morally or legally is just as self-serving and self-righteous as the more militant pro-life people who cry "Adoption not Abortion" but who would never think personally of adopting, especially the severely brain-damaged child or fetus. The crux of the problem may be that we all tend to think of moral decisions as being either all right or all wrong. But rarely is this the case, as the philosopher Nicolai Hartmann has noted in his writings on the nature of ethical decisions. He notes:

> Real moral life is not such that one can stand guiltless in it. And that each person must step by step in life settle conflicts, insoluble theoretically, by his own free sense of values and his own creative energy, should be regarded as a feature of the highest spiritual significance in complete humanity and genuine freedom. Yet one must not make of this a comfortable theory, as the vulgar mind makes of the permissible lie, imagining that one brings upon one-

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self no guilt in offending against clearly discerned values. It is only unavoidable guilt which can preserve a man from moral decay.

Thus the problem with taking an absolute stand of *never* on the abortion question then sets the standard of never taking a human life. And few, if any Christians, are willing to say that such is the case and draw this conclusion, especially with the various just-war theories, unjust-aggressor doctrines, and capital-punishment legislation being currently backed by Christians, and Catholics especially. On the other hand, pro-abortionists who take an absolute stand of abortion-on-demand and claim that the decision is totally up to the mother and that the fetus has no rights whatsoever will have to take another look at the question of the nature of humanhood and personhood and the definition of humanity. For if the fetus, up to the time of so-called viability has no rights at all, then neither do those creatures have any rights who are not viable because of old age, illness, or mental deformity, such as the aforementioned schizophrenic. Likewise, not that many pro-abortionists are willing to trace their logic to its ultimate conclusion.

So where does the Edelin Decision leave us? At the moment in a no-man's land between two absolutists' positions: abortion is never justified versus abortion-on-demand. What the Edelin verdict will do, hopefully, is to force both sides to reexamine their positions very carefully and do some hard thinking about when humanity begins and the consequent rights of the fetus and about the realization that we in fact do make difficult decisions regarding the taking of human life; and sometimes we do opt, as the lesser of two evils, to choose one life over another.

HORSE CHOLER

THE STAGE

Spontaneous applause in the theater tends to come when an actor is suddenly so good—or at least so startling—that the audience can no longer simply absorb the performance silently. There is another occasion for such audience reaction, however—a moment of recognition when a line, an idea, an attitude strikes home and elicits a response. It may be no more than a gag line guying black stereoytpes *(All Over Town)* or the presumed dangers of New York City *(The Prisoner of Second Avenue);* it may be more sustained passages such as the contemporary-sounding sentiments that called up pockets of applause during the Philadelphia engagement of the new Lincoln Center production of *A Doll's House.* In the Plymouth Theatre the other night, when I saw *Equus,* there was an extended burst of applause following the first long speech in which the psychiatrist indicates that he envies his patient for having touched real passion, real pain. Both the positive and the negative reviews had brought me to the theater expecting to find that Peter Shaffer's new play was simply another fashionable success—one part theatricality, one part kinky subject matter—and there I was surrounded by fellow playgoers whose hands were testifying to the validity of the play's main assertion about the dryness and the limitations of so much of life. Not that Shaffer is offering his Dr. Dysart as representative man—or even representative psychiatrist—but the response was more than an appreciation of Anthony Hopkins' playing of the troubled doctor; it was almost a request: give a man a horse he can love.

Equus clearly touches a nerve in the New York audience, as it did earlier in London, which means that it is something more serious *(i.e.,* more timely) than the effectively theatrical play it so obviously is. Not that I am completely taken with it as a play. Its main dramatic action lies in the psychiatrist's longing for an experience, however dangerous, as direct (as "primitive," he would say, tongue slightly in cheek) as that of the young man he is attempting to help (cure? turn to plastic?). Yet, he has no existence outside the consulting room. His marriage, his tourist's commitment to Greece, even his work, except for this one case is given to us—sometimes filtered through a friend—as a verbal exercise, reality as cartoon in the mocking manner of Butley. This is the figure who should embody the substance of the play; yet, the character remains only one remove from a narrator, a stage manager for the unfolding of the boy's story.

There is an inevitable fascination about the young man for whom the horse is both God and a sexual object. He has substituted the suffering horse for the suffering Christ and sees himself in both roles; he is an incipient centaur, at once God and worshipper, victim and victimizer. It would be foolish to try to reduce Alan Strang's delusion/faith to a few sentences because the reality of his situation—for him, for the psychiatrist, for the audience—lies less in its content than in its intensity.

No well-brought up audience can resist the combination of sexuality, religion and violence, and Shaffer attempts to weaken any possible resistance by organizing the play as as a series of scenes in which the patient's acting-out becomes theatrical presentation. There is something a bit too concocted about the mechanism for my taste, the transformation of therapy into detective story, answering *why* rather than *who.* The accumulation of information about Alan is doled out like clues, teasingly, until we find out why the boy who loved horses blinded six of them, mutilating his own God. Many of the scenes are simply informational (how I got my job at the stable) or conventions of cross-generational con-

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flict (running into dad at the porn flic), but the combination of eroticism and stage trickery (the actors on metal cothurni wearing masks) give force to the scenes with the horses. The play edges for two hours toward its big final scene, played in the nude, in which the young man fails sexually in the presence of his accusing gods and blinds them in horror and revenge. Less nuance than heightening hysteria, it demands and gets a tour-de-force performance by the actor playing Alan (Thomas Hulce the night I saw the play). The audience, momentarily one with Alan, shares his moment of high passion and, then, as he collapses in exhaustion, we presumably become the doctor again, feeling not relief for an exorcism but a sense of loss. We file out into the New York streets and—if I read that applause correctly—go back to our own narrow lives. *Equus*, it seems, is more than a high-class melodrama. It is a cry for the power of irrationality. Or an echo.

GERALD WEALES

FLOP HAT

THE SCREEN

Peter Bogdanovich's *At Long Last Love* is a movie with a slow leak. The night I saw it—a Saturday night at Radio City Music Hall—people kept trickling out in twos and threes until, by the end, about a third of the house had left. They hadn't stomped out in a huff, but just wandered out as if they had forgotten what they had come in for— as if they thought there might be something better to look at somewhere else, in the lobby maybe. Since Radio City's audiences are the most patient and tolerant imaginable, if they were bored I can't think of anyone who wouldn't be. Twentieth Century-Fox must have known it was in trouble with this film, for it held only a couple of small, unpublicized screenings before the film opened. Presumably on the theory that it would be better to let the film run awhile before it was widely reviewed, Fox sent many critics passes to see it only after it had opened. This was a mistake too, though, because, as in my case, it allows the audience to review the film for the critics.

All of Bogdanovich's films except one have been re-creations, but in most of them what he was trying to re-create was something that existed, at least partly, in reality. What he is attempting to recreate in *At Long Last Love* existed only in movies. It's the world of the Fred Astaire-Ginger Rogers musical. Several years ago Bogdanovich discovered that one of the studios owns the copyright on a bunch of Cole Porter tunes, and he has attempted to re-create the best sort of thirties musical as a showcase for those tunes. The trouble is that Bogdanovich has somehow missed the point. Incredible as it may seem for the director whose whole reputation is based on his regard for old movies, Bogdanovich appears not to have understood in the most fundamental way what made a musical like *Top Hat*, or any other Astaire-Rogers film, worth watching.

In the first number in *Top Hat*, for example, Astaire is talking to Edward Everett Horton. A few words of conversation fall into a natural cadence, he sings his next line of dialogue acapella, and before we know it he's into "Fancy Free." This is what makes Astaire's films so marvelous—this ability to slip in and out of song, to step into a dance as easily as he would step into a cab. And what makes this marvel possible is the fact that Astaire always seems to be dancing anyway.

Moving on the balls of his feet with his arms slightly akimbo, he makes even the most casual gesture as if there were an Irving Berlin tune playing in his head. He is at his most poised at those moments when the rest of us would be at our most awkward. When he knocks a statue from its pedestal during "Fancy Free," he simply pivots to scoop it up as it falls and continues dancing with it as his partner. Though these little touches of course required more practice and skill than anything else in his routines, they are what give the routines their impromptu, delightfully spontaneous air. Anyone who can be caught off guard so gracefully can never be clumsy no matter what he's doing.

But Bogdanovich gets all this backwards in *At Long Last Love*. The fact that Astaire can *really* dance gives a certain charm to the hokey sets, incredible characters and ridiculous situations in his films. Bogdanovich is under the misapprehension that sets, characters and situations which look like an Astaire-Rogers film will somehow give us the illusion his stars can dance. It just doesn't work that way. Despite all the trappings of *Top Hat*, we still can't help noticing that Burt Reynolds is, to put it mildly, a lummox. He can't dance, he can't sing, and even with a little pencil mustache, he can't really look as if he could, either. In two hours of bum stumbling, Reynolds only manages to find one thing he can do better than Astaire would have—lift Madeline Kahn onto a piano.

Cybill Shepherd fares no better, and Bogdanovich has done her a great disservice putting her in this film because, having nothing else to do, we begin to become disenchanted with her. (I never realized before how weak her chin is and how they wrap scarves around her neck or flounce her hair to hide this.) Miss Shepherd is so heavy-footed that we soon notice she is also just plain heavy. She, Reynolds and Miss Kahn dance their way into our hearts like one of football's triple threats. Surely Bogdanovich could have guessed that he wasn't going to get good musical comedy out of a cast in which Mildred Natwick is the sylph.

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

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BREAD AND RADICAL CHANGE

MICHAEL MOFFITT

In the Human Interest
LESTER BROWN
W. W. Norton & Co., $6.95

By Bread Alone
LESTER BROWN
WITH ERIK ECKHOLM
Praeger, $8.95

ONE would be justifiably skeptical about the scientific content of a socio-economic study which was at least in part sponsored by a "non-profit organization" whose Board of Directors included a number of prominent owners, managers and operatives of giant U.S. multinational corporations. Lester R. Brown is a Senior Fellow at such an organization—the Overseas Development Council. According to a Council report, the organization is attempting to "increase American understanding of the problems faced by developing countries and the importance of the countries to the United States." Among the array of big names which occupy the Council's Board are Robert O. Anderson, chairman of Atlantic-Richfield; Eugene Black, of Chase Manhattan and the World Bank; Edward M. Korry, former U.S. Ambassador to Chile and a participant in ITT's plans to induce "economic collapse" in that country; Edward S. Mason and Raymond Vernon of Harvard, two leading ideologists of global capitalism; and David Rockefeller himself. Experience has shown that what one usually finds in such studies amounts to the academic equivalent of prostitution: the scholar performs in a manner which the Board members would approve of; with the usual result being that the underdeveloped countries, however wretched and miserable they might be, are advised that they should never lose faith in the ability of capitalist development to remedy their problems.

Fortunately, Lester Brown and his assistant, Erik Eckholm, have more integrity than that, and consequently my criticism of their efforts will rest on more substantive grounds. Brown is not a Rostow, in other words. He has become a well-respected figure in the field of "development" studies and his books are always timely, full of relevant statistical information and passionately argued. His two most recent books, *In the Human Interest* and *By Bread Alone* (with Erik Eckholm), are particularly important because they express views which are widely shared and bear heavily upon the debate surrounding the 1974 world conferences on food and population. Yet I believe it can be shown that, despite his obvious concern for the people of the underdeveloped countries, Brown falls far short of offering the people of the underdeveloped world any substantial break with their dismal past and real hope for the future.

Let us begin with a brief description of Lester Brown's view of the world and the contemporary crisis in which it finds itself: "In reality, our world today is largely illiterate; one overfed and overweight, one hungry and malnourished; one affluent and consumption-oriented, one poverty stricken and subsistence-oriented." (*In the Human Interest*, p. 99)

Elsewhere in the same book Brown describes in greater detail what this means for the latter world: "Unfortunately, poverty is not an economic abstraction. It is a human condition. It is despair, grief and pain. It is the despair of a father of seven who must join the swelling ranks of the unemployed with no prospect of unemployment compensation. Poverty is the longing of a young boy playing outside a village school but unable to enter because his parents lack the few dollars needed to buy textbooks. Poverty is the grief of parents watching helplessly as their three-year-old child dies of a routine childhood disease because, like half of mankind, they do not have access to any medical care." (p. 100)

For such inhuman living conditions in the underdeveloped world to exist side-by-side with the "growing affluence" of the industrialized world, especially given the high level of technological development and the state of scientific knowledge in the twentieth century, Brown realizes is not simply a matter of one or two popular crises which fill the daily newspapers (the world hunger crisis, the population crisis, etc.); but the convergence of all of these crises at their common starting and finishing points; mass poverty. The great majority of the people in the underdeveloped (or Third) world attempt to survive on subsistence incomes, their diets are grossly inadequate, decent health care and education are virtually non-existent because these people are simply too poor to avail themselves of the benefits of modern science and technology. Many are simply untouched by meaningful economic activity. The poverty of their societies, in turn, manifests itself most visibly in low agricultural productivity, chronically deficient foreign exchange reserves (reserves of other countries' currencies which a country may use to import goods from other countries), and the massive wastage of human resources which I have just mentioned—often an underdeveloped country's greatest economic resource—can contribute nothing to a country's growth if they lie idle. The International Labor Office estimated that at least one-quarter of the labor force in the underdeveloped countries was unemployed or underemployed in 1970 and that this would rise to 30 percent in 1980. Often valuable resources which might otherwise be used to improve the welfare of many people are squandered on the construction of huge military establishments. In addition,

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what wealth is generated by economic activity in these societies is often concentrated in the hands of a few who live like Rockefellers or foreign corporations who repatriate a large share of their earnings to foreign countries. To cite but one example, from 1965 to 1968, global corporations operating in the mining, petroleum, and smelting industries in Latin America, 83 percent of all investment funds were generated in the underdeveloped country itself, yet 79 percent of all profits generated by this investment were repatriated out of the country. Thus the Latin American country contributed over four-fifths of every investment dollar to these very profitable enterprises, yet only one-fifth of every dollar of profit remained in the particular country.

Within this general context of poverty, of course, other factors have a much more dramatic impact than they do under other conditions. Rapid population growth is an example. While growth rates in the advanced countries (capitalist and non-capitalist alike) have begun to level off or decline, many regions of the underdeveloped world have stubbornly resisted various population control measures. In objective terms, this means that there are more mouths to feed from limited supplies of food, more unemployed workers competing for limited job opportunities, and hence driving low wage rates even lower, and thus even greater numbers are added to the "marginal" population consisting of beggars, prostitutes and hucksters in the overcrowded urban areas. While in the rural sectors, many poor farmers must attempt to feed growing families with tracts of land and equipment that barely provide subsistence, let alone a surplus to sell on the open market. In addition, such phenomena as inflation, energy and various commodity shortages, droughts and natural disasters inevitably take a greater toll on the poor countries than on the affluent. For example, in *By Bread Alone,* Brown notes that ". . . for the sizable segment of mankind that spends 80 percent of its income on food, a doubling in the price of wheat or rice cannot possibly be offset by increased expenditures. It can only drive a subsistence diet below the survival level." (p. 62) The price of wheat and rice, he notes, *tripled* between 1972 and 1974.

The reader might expect (and indeed has a right to demand) that since it is clear that poverty is the essential problem and cause of deprivation in the underdeveloped world, Brown would give us some sort of indication as to why he believes that the underdeveloped world developed, as it did, into poverty and the developed world into affluence. But if the reader expects this, he or she will be disappointed. Lester Brown has no idea how the underdeveloped world developed into such a state; he simply assumes it. Though he often pays lip-service to the fact that this is a dynamic and not a static world, his analysis is for the most part static, and almost thoroughly devoid of historical content. This criticism I will elaborate upon presently, but first I must introduce another important train of Brown's thought into his model.

Brown knows that this kind of a situation will not continue forever in the present form. For a number of reasons, he believes that unless some sort of program which will promote progressive change is soon embarked upon, that which he calls this system of "interdependent" nations will collapse and lead to innumerable crises of catastrophic proportions. Global economic activity, consumption of resources, and production of wasteful commodities have all been increasing at exponential rates. At the same time that affluence and higher consumption levels in the advanced countries gobble up the lion's share of increased wealth and productivity, unequal distribution of income and population growth threaten even the miniscule gains which the poor countries have registered. Because to some extent the poor countries realize this, they are beginning to take protectionist measures to safeguard the raw materials with which they supply the industrial countries. These resources appear to be scarce relative to increasing demand and hence more valuable (and more expensive) to those whose economies depend upon the large-scale importation of raw materials. Should these resources prove to be exhaustible, as a number of projections seem to suggest, then the corresponding effect would be a combination of increased competition for limited supplies and cutbacks in production. Without sufficient raw materials, economic growth would certainly decline. And because of the nature of global interdependence, the cumulative effects would be like ripples on a pond —and the effects would naturally be more traumatic in the poor countries.

For example, Japan and the United States are both large exporters of nitrogenous fertilizers which are made from natural gas. Japan, which imports roughly 99 percent of her energy needs, announced cutbacks in fertilizer production and reduced her exports because the energy crisis sent prices skyrocketing and produced shortages at home. At the same time, the U.S. was in the midst of returning cropland, idle for years under government subsidy programs, to cultivation and thus exported less of her supply of fertilizer. Hence farmers in poor countries suffered both from inflated prices and absolute shortages, thus condemning many to bankruptcy, deeper indebtedness, or starvation. Clearly, if such a tendency were to manifest itself in raw materials other than energy, and Brown believes that this is a distinct possibility, then the consequences for the world's poor would be beyond statistical measurement.

To Brown, however, this phenomenon of interdependence can also be a warning signal, if properly heeded. It is for this reason that he envisions some sort of new international cooperation on what he sees as mankind's most pressing problems; dwindling food reserves, population growth in poor countries, environmental deterioration and resource scarcity. For the most part, his proposals are not original and all too often rely upon moral pleas to summon forth from national leaders such intangible qualities as "leadership." Why such proposals are as impractical and divorced from the realities of international economics and politics as his analysis itself is the matter to which I now turn.

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One basic problem with Lester Brown's analytical approach to the current world crisis and hence with his prescriptions for reversing what he believes to be disastrous trends is his whole notion of interdependence. His heavy reliance upon and indiscriminate use of that term converts it from what it basically is, an antagonistic relationship between rich and poor countries, into some kind of a relationship which is (or can be) essentially harmonious. (To be sure, there is "interdependence" other than that between the rich and the poor countries. However, because the interdependent relationship between the advanced countries is vastly different from that between the advanced and the underdeveloped countries, it does not seem to be an essential part of the discussion here.) That Brown does not realize this I am sure of, but it is completely consistent with his propensity to analyze the outward manifestations of a social system and to ignore its essence. Clearly, what we need to do is inquire into the origins and continuing development of this poverty and underdevelopment. This is what we mean by the "essence" of a social system—what makes the wheels of a social system turn—as opposed to what the end products (e.g., poverty and deprivation) of this cumulative social process are. Let us examine this more closely.

Relations between the advanced and underdeveloped countries have assumed a variety of forms during the past five or six centuries, but the substance of the relationship has always remained the same: the poor countries have made indispensable contributions to the accumulation of wealth (capital) in the developed countries while their own societies have proceeded to sink deeper into relative poverty and underdevelopment. This, I assert, has been the *driving force* of relations between Brown's "rich" and "poor" countries since the dawn of Western colonialism and there is no reason to believe that, given the absence of basic *structural* (i.e., systemic) changes in both the underdeveloped and the advanced countries, things will be any different in the near future. Of course all of this escapes Brown precisely because he is content to analyze merely the outward manifestations of this distorted interdependence rather than the core of the whole problem. Imperialism, in other words, is the *cause* of poverty, not a result of poverty. It follows that proposed solutions which attack only the symptoms of this complex historical phenomenon will be no more successful in treating the essence of poverty than Brown's analysis has been in revealing why the poor countries are poor in the first place.

It is this lack of understanding of the nature of what we are dealing with which allows Brown to sincerely call for a "major increase in the general flow of resources from the rich countries to poor." In reality, what he more properly might ask for is that the poor countries first terminate the flow of massive amounts of capital which move annually from their respective countries to the rich countries. These capital flows take the form of low prices paid for valuable raw materials, dividends, global corporations' repatriation of huge profits on investment, servicing of old debts, management fees and so on. Annually, these flows far outweigh any direct aid or development assistance which flows from the rich countries and multilateral agencies to the poor. This represents an enormous cash drain from the underdeveloped countries.

We are certainly not suggesting that the countries of the underdeveloped world withdraw from the world economy, but that they vehemently insist that they participate as equals rather than as exploited. In other words, they might begin by refusing to sell their natural resources to global corporations at bargain rates and stop offering their work forces to these corporations at wage rates and working conditions which prevailed in the nineteenth century United States. How the former might be accomplished has been demonstrated with sheer brilliance by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and is being attempted by unions of other poor countries which produce sizable quantities of critical raw materials. (In no way should this statement be interpreted as supportive of the oppressive regimes which rule the great majority of OPEC countries. The reader should take the statement at face value as regards economic relations between the rich countries and the poor.) The latter proposal is, of course, less feasible, since the President Thieus and General Pinochets of the world are no more concerned with the welfare of their own workers than is the president of IBM.

Of course, all of Brown's analysis is uncluttered by this talk of "classes" and "exploitation" because he simply does not include them in any systematic way in his model of the contemporary world. Though class analysis—which is, at least in part, the same thing as "distribution"—should be central to any model of political economy, Brown barely acknowledges that classes exist in the rich countries and inadequately analyzes the matter in poor countries. With regard to the "rich" countries, I will proceed on the assumption that Brown is aware that "rich, overfed, and affluent" are hardly accurate descriptions of large segments of the populations of the so-called rich countries, and that what he really means when he talks about the "rich" countries are the powerful and affluent persons and organizations in these countries who make their needs into public policy. And I would suggest that Brown keep a very close watch on the development of the current economic crisis. My guess is that once inflation and recession of the current magnitude have taken their course, there will be quite a lot less "affluence" in the rich countries than there has been heretofore; hence his general categories are likely to become increasingly anachronistic.

As far as the poor countries are concerned, Brown shows little knowledge of class and social stratification and its implications for the distribution of the fruits of production in these countries. This is particularly true when he discusses the productivity gains in agriculture which many poor countries made in the 1960s. These were made primarily by the introduction of new higher-yielding varieties of seeds, the introduction of more capital intensive

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technology and expanding the total acreage under cultivation. Thus total wheat output in India grew from 11 million tons in 1965 to 27 million tons in 1972. Mexico, Pakistan, Turkey and Sri Lanka were other countries which registered impressive productivity gains. But nevertheless, benefits for particular countries resulting from the "Green Revolution" in agriculture were not so dramatic as to convince World Bank President Robert McNamara that they provide any long-term solution for the World's poor. In his 1972 address to the Bank's Board of Governors, McNamara noted that "The miracle of the Green Revolution may have arrived, but for the most part the poor farmer has not been able to participate in it. He simply cannot afford to pay for the irrigation, the pesticide, the fertilizer—or perhaps even the land itself on which his title may be vulnerable and his tenancy uncertain."

Numerous other studies of agricultural production in poor countries point to the same unequal distribution of the benefits of increased productivity. In his Brookings Institution study of nutrition and development, Alan Berg noted that "More meat is being raised in Central America than ever before; it seems, however, to be ending up not in Latin American stomachs but in franchised restaurant hamburgers in the United States . . . A 75 percent increase in meat production in Nicaragua was accompanied by only a three percent increase in average consumption; a 40 percent increase in Guatemala by a 6 percent decrease in average consumption; and a 92 percent increase in Costa Rica by a 26 percent decline in per capita consumption."

Actually this should come as little or no surprise. Franchised hamburger stands offer a much more attractive long-term market for farmers in the poor countries than do the masses of people in these countries—simply because they do not have sufficient income to create consistent demand for these products. Again, it is clear that the immediate problem lies in the maldistribution of income. McNamara notes that one study of income distribution in 39 developing countries found that in eight countries, the per capita income of the richest 5 percent of the population is *more than 30 times greater than that of the poorest 40 percent of the population*. In sixteen of the countries, the difference between the lowest 40 percent and the upper 5 percent ranged between sixteen and twenty-nine times greater. This is not to speak of the growing inequality between the "rich" and the poor countries. As MIT's Paul Rosenstein-Rodan has pointed out, at the beginning of this century, the per capita income of persons in the underdeveloped countries was one-half the per capita income of people in the advanced countries; by 1970, their incomes were one-twentieth of persons living in the advanced countries. Much of this growing income disparity comes about, not as Brown would have us believe, as a result of population growth, but because of the penetration of underdeveloped economies by multinational corporations. Contrary to popular belief, the global giants have a tendency to displace more workers than they create jobs for, hence swelling the ranks of the unemployed and exercising a negative influence on income distribution. To be sure, population growth also contributes to the unemployment problems of poor countries, but more often the case is that high fertility rates only exacerbate underlying trends. To give but one example, a recent study cited in *Global Reach* by Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller of 257 manufacturing corporations in Latin America "shows that global corporations use almost half the number of employees per ten thousand dollars of sales as do local companies. From 1925 to 1970, the percentage of the Latin American work force employed in the manufacturing sector actually *decreased*." Clearly, if the ability to eat is a function of one's income, trends in income distribution in poor countries offer no grounds for optimism.

As for Brown's other proposed solutions to the world food crisis, they also bring to the forefront the greatest deficiencies of his analysis. Namely, like those of so many humanists, Brown's brand of humanism has little or no structural foundation and because of this, he often misleads himself into thinking that his quixotic world is the real one. A case in point is his call for the affluent consumers in the advanced world to consume less than they have heretofore and that they should also strive for less wasteful and more ecological modes of consumption. Brown is by no means alone in this. The Catholic Church, among others, has called on its members to fast twice per week in order that more food might be sent to the needy abroad. In Brown's words, in *In The Human Interest*, "Combined with appropriate national and international policies in the trade, monetary and aid areas, the systematic simplification of life styles in the more affluent countries would free resources which could then be used to help the less developed countries solve their basic economic and social problems." (p. 177) Presumably, this "systematic simplification" will lead to an overall stabilization of rates of economic growth in the advanced countries and to a more equitable international distribution of resources. Things would certainly be much simpler if this transfer of resources from the rich countries to the poor were plausible; unfortunately any beginning student in economics knows that it is not. In a passage worth quoting at length, the *Wall Street Journal* for Nov. 12, 1974 emphasizes this point with remarkable clarity: ". . . the U.S. delegation to the World Food Conference in Rome has proposed a resolution to restrict the non-agricultural use of fertilizer. The notion is that the bag of fertilizer you don't use on your lawn will somehow show up on a rice paddy in Bangladesh. . . . If you restrict non-agricultural uses of fertilizer for example, you reduce demand and therefore price. Theoretically this will be of some temporary benefit to the farmer in Bangladesh, for he can buy more fertilizer with the same money, if he has any money and anyone can get the fertilizer to him. But in all but the shortest run, the lower price is going to mean that less fertilizer will be produced in the

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world. Lower fertilizer production does not help feed the hungry."

And the *Journal* concludes that "It would be comforting to believe that eating less here would provide more for the hungry abroad, but instead it will mean lower prices and lower production . . . Doing penance with a brown lawn may for all we know save your soul and eating less is likely to save your heart. But neither has much to do with feeding Bangladesh; for that we need policies attuned not to the next world but to the harsh but inescapable economics of this one."

What the *Journal* is saying, in essence, is precisely what I have maintained; that the consumption of food, fertilizer, or anything else, is a function of one's income and the existence of an economic mechanism (the market, in this case) which will transfer ownership from producer to consumer. If either of these things are lacking (in our case, at least the first is lacking), then the transfer of ownership will not take place, "Need" in and of itself does nothing whatsoever to create "demand" unless it is backed up with purchasing power. Put differently, in the words of economist David Snow, "demand" means "can afford." The higher the price, the greater the incentive provided to those who produce such necessities as fertilizer to produce more and ship it to Bangladesh, or if the demand is great enough, to set up a plant in Bangladesh to produce it. But we have seen that precisely the problem in the underdeveloped countries, at least in the short run, is the lack of real purchasing power, both for the countries as a whole and for the vast majority of the people who live in those countries. Clearly to call for reduced consumption in the advanced countries and hope that somehow the goods will find their way to the poor countries, is to *avoid*, rather than confront the critical issues of the world food crisis.

Thus, because it is so devoid of structural analysis, Lester Brown's model of change is left with no other viable alternative but population control. In Brown's mind, this must seem highly contradictory, because he reminds us many times that population control can take place effectively only within the context of general economic and social betterment for the people who have the greatest need for population control—the poorest people in the underdeveloped countries. And because many of these countries which we are discussing lack even the basic social infra-structures to undertake a social project such as population control, it is doubtful that population control will be successful even on its own limited and self-contradictory terms.

All is not without hope, however, for Brown gives us an indication as to where he really believes hope lies in the future for the poor countries. In a revealing passage in *By Bread Alone,* he tells us that "Perhaps the best example of how an array of economic and social policies can be used to slow population growth is the comprehensive effort now under way to satisfy what is determined were the basic social needs of the Chinese people. For a country with limited economic and natural resources, China has been remarkably successful in achieving ambitious goals in mass literacy, nutrition and public health . . . At the same time, a nationwide network of family-planning clinics has been established offering a full range of free contraceptive services—not only condoms, but also the pill, the IUD, and sterilization. The nationwide availability of birth control services is reinforced by an intensive educational program designed to instill an awareness of the relationship between China's future population growth and both individual and national well-being. Free abortion services are readily available in rural as well as urban areas . . . Government-supported efforts to secure equal rights for women in a sphere of economic and political activity are designed to provide means of self-fulfillment other than childbearing." (p. 190)

Unfortunately for the people of the underdeveloped world, they do not live in countries that resemble China and therefore, Brown has only orthodox Malthusian proposals to offer them, coupled with his hopes for some redistribution and modest increases in agricultural productivity. Though his proposals are basically those of a Malthusian, ideologically, Brown's views are probably closer to those of a John Stuart Mill. Like Mill, Brown envisions the evolution of some sort of "stationary state" in which economic growth in the advanced countries gradually ebbs and the accumulation of wealth (capital) is drastically reduced. This should, he undoubtedly believes, be accompanied by a massive transfer of wealth to the underdeveloped countries. However, economic theory would suggest that under conditions of advanced capitalism, this looks more like a formula for permanent depression than a policy for stabilization, which Brown believes it to be. As in the case of lower fertilizer production, depression in the advanced countries does not "help feed the hungry."

Some will object that I have overexaggerated the unworkability and logical flaws of Lester Brown's and Erik Eckholm's scenario for change. I probably have. I do not doubt for a moment that some governments in the underdeveloped world may be successful in their attempts to curb rampant population growth; increase the incredibly low-level of agricultural and industrial productivity with the introduction of modern equipment and knowledge, and even deliver some measure of relief to desperate and starving people. Some stagnant economies may begin to grow, *per capita* incomes may rise, and, a few dictators may be overthrown. All of this, however, does not necessarily imply that progressive social change will occur in these countries, or at least what I believe is meant by the term. In other words, any proposed solutions to the world hunger crisis and the world population crisis are of necessity solutions to the world "development" crisis, or they are no solutions at all. As far as I can tell, Brown offers the underdeveloped countries no such solutions. This is precisely what I have tried to show: That someone who deals only with the outward manifestations of a social system is likely to be a poor and hopelessly inadequate advocate of real social change.

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THE CORPORATION & EMPIRE ECONOMICS

KIRKPATRICK SALE

Global Reach

RICHARD J. BARNET &
RONALD E. MULLER

Simon & Schuster, $11.95

Of the power and menace of the global corporations there can no longer be any doubt. If ITT and Chile wasn't enough to convince everyone, then surely Exxon and the "oil crisis" have, or the American grain marketers and the Russian wheat deal, or the Rockefellers' IBEC and its Latin American exploitation—not to mention the Vietnam war and the worldwide commodity shortages.

Corporations which owe allegiance to no country and exact tribute from all have grown in just the last decade to a position of dominance that has never before been known in the economic world. They control assets of more than $200 billion, monopolize the largest part of world trade, and, more than any single government are able to dictate how people are to live, work, buy, play, congregate, teach, learn, and perceive the world. In the hands of the upper-level managers of no more than 300 global corporations lies power heretofore denied to all but a few leaders of nations.

And it is all to malevolent purpose. Global corporations, even more than national ones, have only one principle, and that is the maximization of profits at any human cost. Given their size, their reach, their wealth, and their technology, they can manipulate workers and governments alike and feel no compunction about distorting political or social processes as they do so. They are without the restraint of laws—international business law is virtually nonexistent, and there's always some country where anything is allowed (one global bank executive has noted, "U.S. companies have had virtually complete freedom to do what they pleased in Mexico, as compared to the restrictions that are imposed upon them in the United States"). They are without the restraint of political or patriotic allegiance—though mostly American-run, they owe nothing by custom or sentiment to the established nation-states, including the United States. (Union Carbide policy: "It is not proper for an international corporation to put the welfare of any country in which it does business above that of any other.") And they are without the restraint or social sanctions or cultural ethics—they exist beyond the norms and pressures of any particular society, their managers are designedly made and kept rootless, and the profit motive is their only moral guide (a Caltex vice president on the proclamation of dictatorship in the Phillipines: "Martial law has significantly improved the business climate").

It is this unquestionably frightening picture that Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller seek to portray in the 500 large pages of their much-acclaimed book. They succeed. Indeed, they oversucceed: by the first fifth of the book we are all convinced of their message, and from then on we are loaded with additional restatements of it in one form or another, the weight of which is no doubt convincing but also pretty hard on the back. If their intention was to alert the general reader and convert the expert, they have certainly gone a long way toward that—but they have simultaneously overwhelmed the former and bemired the latter. They would have been better served by a more judicious editing and honing of the book—*always* especially necessary with two authors—to eliminate the extraneous material (much too much time is taken up with descriptions of big business in general, unnecessary here and familiar from other studies) and by a more careful organization that would have eliminated the deadening repetitions (in the first section we learn how bad the global corporations are, in the second how bad for other nations, in the third how bad for us, and by the end the record seems stuck).

> "A succession of visitors to China, Cuba, Tanzania and North Vietnam have been struck by the genuine enthusiasm of the people to participate in what they are repeatedly told are great social experiments. In these countries the population is continually being asked to believe that they are 'new people' who by virtue of their own abilities and energies are able to transform their societies in ways unknown in human history. Backed by the power of the state, the primary appeal is to personal and national pride. Yet in societies where the advertising agency is the Ministry of Propaganda, the opposite appeal is made. The effect is to encourage the disparagement of local culture and the dependence on foreign culture. The psychiatrist Michael Maccoby tells the story of visiting a potter in a rural Mexican village who made magnificent painted plates of the sort that command high prices in New York. To honor his visitor, he served him lunch on plastic plates from Woolworth's. The subtle message of the global advertiser in poor countries is: Neither you nor what you create are worth very much. We will sell you a civilization."
>
> —*Global Reach*, p. 178-9

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But I don't mean to carp on the book's form: it makes for a tough read, as they say in the trade, and keeps it from being as powerful and popular as it should be, but the facts and figures are all there, the analysis is intelligent and the biases sound, and anyone wanting a complete and up-to-date portrait of the new phenomenon of global corporatism, told in language neither shrill nor sectarian, should start here.

There are two criticisms, however, I would like to offer, and they go to the heart rather than the form of the book.

First, I think Barnet and Müller fail to understand the underlying reasons for the rise of the global corporation and thereby misjudge its nature. The fact that multinational enterprises became economically significant only in the mid-1960s, just as the American empire was collapsing and the Vietnam adventure proved its weakness, is not an accident: the global corporation was American capitalism's answer to the end of empire. If the American flag and the American gunboat were no longer able to protect the markets and permit the exploitations, then something new had to be devised, a more sophisticated way of assuring worldwide operability and imperial control, based not on military but technological might, not on national diplomacy but international finance. (After all, the Pope has no armies . . .) American capitalism—and behind it European and Japanese—learned how to use its monopoly of modern technology, its stranglehold on capital sources, its dominance of production and distribution, and its command of advertising and marketing to control the populations and the countries that heretofore had to be controlled by crude force. *Corporate imperialism* replaced *national imperialism*.

Barnet and Müller sense this dimly, but they never appreciate its ramifications, and are led thereby into a kind of sentimentality about the *old* ways of the world. Not that they have any visible love for the American empire, but they do keep worrying about American well-being—they spend several chapters bemoaning that the U.S. is becoming, Heaven forbid, like an undeveloped country, that its people are being impoverished, that gaps between rich and poor are growing—in fact, that things are going to be as bad for *us* and for *them*. They also develop a peculiar attachment to the American nation-state, which takes on the beneficence of contrast: because the multinationals, which have a global reach, are bad, then the American state, which is more limited, must be good, or at least better. And ultimately this odd chauvinism leads them to call for American solutions to global corporatism, action by American communities, American lawmakers, even, strike me blind, American *bureaucracies*.

> "There has never been a time since the Great Depression when there has been more economic uncertainty around the world. But the corporate prospect of a world without borders offers something more distressing than uncertainty. It is a vision without ultimate hope for the majority of mankind. . . . Present and projected strategies of global corporations offer little hope for the problems of mass starvation, mass unemployment, and gross inequality. Indeed the global corporation aggravates all these problems, because the social system it is helping to create violates three fundamental human needs: social balance, ecological balance, and psychological balance."
>
> —*Global Reach*, p. 364

Secondly, perhaps because they lack an understanding of corporate imperialism, Barnet and Müller are at a total loss for ways to deal with it. They push their cart through the supermarket of solutions, pulling ideas off the shelf apparently at random: more international regulation, more national watchdogs, laws for more domestic investment and return of foreign profits, laws to break up bank holding companies, stronger labor unions to prevent runaway plants, stronger community controls over what firms move in or out, redistribution of wealth from the richest to the poorest, and self-sufficiency in natural resources. All reasonable ideas, I suppose, but the point is that none of them stands a chance of being enacted as long as corporate imperialism is working and the world managers don't fall asleep at the switch. After all if, as these authors say, global corporations are more powerful than single nations and have a true international scope, they will not be broken or controlled by simple intra-national regulations—especially regulations written by legislators or rulers lobbied so heavily, supported so well, and propagandized so effectively by these companies. If the U.S. Congress, for example, were capable of even a start in this direction, it would long ago have raised corporate income taxes and prevented the incredible 15-year decline in the percentage of national revenues provided by U.S. companies (down by 10 percent while national expenditures have gone up 370 percent). But to think, as Barnet and Müller sometimes seem to, that American lawmakers want to destroy global imperialism is of course the height of folly: might as well ask flies to clean up horseshit.

None of which is meant to deny the value of this book, only to suggest its limitations. The literature of global imperialism is still not so very extensive—a few academic journals and conference reports, a couple of AFL-CIO pamphlets, several Congressional committee studies, a cluster of specialized works, parts of Galbraith, some of Heilbroner, and some popular books like Anthony Sampson's *ITT* and Servan-Schreiber's *American Challenge* —and this particular volume is without question a welcome addition. After all you have to know the enemy before you can defeat it.

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Manual Labor

FREDERICK BUSCH

New Directions, $8.50

IRVING MALIN

Manual Labor begins dramatically. A never-to-be-born infant "thinks": *"After I died they moved from Massachusetts where they rose early and worked all day at projects with their hands."* Although his words are supernatural, they suggest the fact that *they*, Phil and Anne Sorenson, are driven to confront the meaning of infant mortality, their disjointed marriage, and the mysteries of life and art.

The novel is patterned carefully. After the infant thinks of events which he has not witnessed, he surrenders as it were, to Anne's "letter." This letter is an attempt to expiate her guilt, to shore up her existence. She writes rapidly, madly, and painfully. Her sentences "drown" her, but she manages to recognize some reasons for her contradictions and mistakes. She begins to understand the need for patterns (even if they distort reality) and word-play. She is on the way to full recovery; she "dangles," nevertheless, when she breaks off her letter: "You can die of words. I don't want to die, Mamma, I'm like you, I don't want to die, Mamma, *Mamma*. . . ."

Phil writes the next section. He is more professional; he tells himself that "I'm sure that narrative leads to sanity, and slowly, carefully, chiseling the details, I must make what's happening come from what's happened; that will tell me what's to come. I have to organize, pull it into lines, directions. I will not go mad. Anne won't go mad. We'll survive." Although he writes painstakingly, unlike Anne, he is unsure of his complete power (artistic, masculine, spiritual). He is also haunted by the ghosts of family life.

Phil works steadily. His manual labor symbolizes his artistic endeavor. (The novel is about various marriages.) When he is unable to construct correct patterns, he is uneasy. He is afraid, unlike Anne, to court madness and sleep. Phil gives up his craft when he is forced to explore an abandoned church: "I went on down, barely looking at any place, hardly seeing the step I stepped down to, feeling with my hand on the dusty wooden bannister, hearing my breath, then hearing my heart beating over the sounds of my breathing—they were two separate rhythms. . . ." Phil discovers a "ghost" in the church, and his relationship to this figure (and Anne) takes up the rest of the novel.

The ghost, we slowly learn, is a runaway named Abe. He has his own story to tell. He is a former government official who has turned his back on false pieties—this is the time of our Vietnam engagement—and attempted to find roots in the land. He is a cynical, worldly Thoreau. (Thus his presence contrasts that of the dead infant.) He manages to free Anne from madness and death, but he sacrifices himself in the process.

Phil writes about the "triangle." (Actually there is a more complex geometrical figure in the novel.) He realizes that he is "tangled in the lines," that *life wrenches art out of shape* (and vice versa). He continues at his labor, knowing as did Anne earlier, that words are somehow "corpses": "I will not lie again, not this way. No more lousy poems, no more still-born narratives: I'll do whatever I do, and then it will be done, and I'll be through."

There is great irony. Phil stops writing at last because he must face Abe and Anne. When he finally does, he confronts silences, eternal questions. He learns that "life" is as empty as the blank page; it must be "constructed" to hold meaning.

We do not see Phil returning to his task—unless the entire novel is his?—but we read the words of his dead infant. We are back at the beginning; we have completed, however, a significant cycle. The last words (within the infant's narrative) are "We'll live." They are spoken by Anne. There is no gloss upon them; they are empty and strangely hopeful.

Manual Labor is a novel about marriage—it affirms the tense vitality of relationships and, by doing so, it exorcises past ghosts. It is, at the same time, a remarkable union of philosophy and manual labor. It is, therefore, an artistic design.

Collected Poems, 1924-1974

JOHN BEECHER

Macmillan, $8.95

JOHN DRUSKA

About the time that John Beecher was discovering poetry in a Birmingham steel mill, Henry Miller was finding that in the American workaday world, as he later recounted in *Tropic of Capricorn*, "The taste goes out of the bread as it goes out of life. Getting the bread becomes more important than the eating of it." Through Beecher's *Collected Poems* we come across extremes of this syndrome, cases of men harried not by the desire to make it in a big way, but by the need to get enough to survive day by day in a system that severely restricts their means of survival. In the '20s there's the switchman who loses a leg in the mill. The workers expect to see him "on the street with a tin cup," if at all; but he returns to the mill as a human billboard:

> . . . the superintendent saw what an ad
> the Negro would make with his peg leg
> so he hung a sandwich on him
> with safety slogans
> and he told the Negro just to keep walking
> all day up and down the plant
> and be an example
> ("Report to the Stockholders," V)

In the '30s there's the sharecropper, trapped in a spiral of rising costs, who raises his kids on "cornbread, buttermilk and greens," and who could be sent to the chain-gang "If he killed a calf to feed his family/ . . . for slaughtering mortgaged stock" ("In Egypt Land"). He dies in jail, after rebelling and leading a shootout with the local deputies. In the '50s there are the communal farmers who "took Negroes in/

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and treated them as brothers," and who need "to get seed peanuts/to plant their fields":

They sent two women and a little boy
aged nine
to try to buy peanuts up and down Georgia
One place a man cursed these women out
for 'dirty niggerloving whores'
and yelled to raise a mob
("Just Peanuts")

Unlike Miller, though, who turned away from the American social experience to a kind of inspired self-scape, Beecher continued to believe in the perfectibility of the country. Throughout his work he attends to America's need to become American, to allow each of its people a real stake in the land. He thinks change is possible if the nation awakens to its inequities and adheres to the principles on which it was founded. And he takes it upon himself to help awake the nation.

Beecher's poetry is his recurrent act of telling stories and talking common sense about things that have happened and are happening—his life and his ancestors' lives, the history of the nation and the news. He often reminisces through ironic anecdotes, forked with his sympathy for the disenfranchised and their champions and with his distaste for the boss-sanctioned injustices that hem in men's lives. Others have compared his more austere narratives to Masters' *Spoon River Anthology*, and works like *To Live and Die in Dixie* and *Phantom City: A Ghost Town Gallery*, both included in *Collected Poems*, bear out this resemblance. Some of Beecher's poems are expressly hortatory, in a way his cautionary State of the Union addresses. One of these, "Think It Over, America" ("Americans, you have got to forget all this abracadabra/about what we can afford and can't afford"), sounds in part like a forefather of Allen Ginsberg's "America." And Beecher invites comparison with poets like Ginsberg and Carl Sandburg, who have offered incantations of various kinds over the nation. When Beecher pulls away from anecdote and exhortation to generalize ("Beaufort Tides"), or when he strikes a more formal rhetorical pose ("The Camaldolese Come to Big Sur"), his poems seem less successful, perhaps because we lose the ease of his voice talking to us plain, we miss that sense of rage he pens in the bitter ironies of his tales, or at times makes patent.

There isn't much development in method or theme through Beecher's poetry; he appears more concerned with the replication of themes that have mattered to him all along, voiced in the natural rhythms of everyday speech. He counts on the moral force of his voice, rather than its music, and on his evocation of real scenes to move us. As much as he risks those plain-speaking pitfalls of sentimentality and banal rhetoric, I think his poems usually work well within the limits he sets for them. And I like his way of writing about things—migrant camps, loyalty oaths, Kittredge's classroom—from the inside looking out.

Beecher clearly believes in the power of his plain-speaking to cause change, as in "Engagement at Salt Fork," where Beecher and other '60s war-protestors talk things out with some local antagonists, "till they came to see/the meaning of our walk":

Long after midnight it was when the last
of them went home. I could not sleep for pride
in these my people, still square-shooters, still
ready to tote fair with the other man.
I could not sleep for sadness too, to think
how these great hearts are gulled with lies.
God help the liars when my people awake!

I can't say I wholly share his faith in those "great hearts" or in America's coming of age. But, after all, Nixon's out, and this could be the best time for poets who talk plain and tote fair, like Beecher, to speak up and speak louder. Seldom before in America had public language been more distanced from reality than it was under our last regime. Beecher's poetry, addressed as it is to a grassroots audience, might be just what we need to bring poetry closer to the public arena, to get people speaking the truth to each other, to begin putting people back in touch with themselves.

No Peaceful Way

GARY MACEOIN

Sheed & Ward, $6.95

Chile: Under Military Rule

IDOC/North America, $4.95

The Latin American Revolution

DONALD C. HODGES

Morrow, $9.95

JOE NICHOLSON JR.

I remember that chilly September day in 1970, standing in front of La Moneda, Chile's presidential palace, and watching them, some barefoot and ragged, streaming into Santiago to celebrate Salvador Allende's victory as the first freely elected Marxist in the Western Hemisphere. From suburban working class communities and the outlying shantytowns in the shadow of the Andes Mountains, they came down the broad Alameda Bernardo O'Higgins, chanting and dancing in great circles while I, then an Associated Press reporter, scribbled madly.

They were the Chileans, the workers and the destitute, who rode an historical roller coaster upward for three years with Allende, achieving better pay and unprecedented participation in their government, before a military coup sent them pitching down a precipice.

No Peaceful Way relates this story—a story which Gary MacEoin calls a microcosm of Latin America where natural resources are legally looted by "the international structures of domination and dependence" and where "some luxuriate in abundance while others starve." When Allende's nationalizations threatened this setup, the legal looters

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successfully conspired with Henry Kissinger and the Chilean oligarchy to crush him.

MacEoin, a journalist, poet, philosopher, lawyer and author of numerous books on Latin America, displays impressive research and writes with understated grace. In fact, he describes the junta's atrocities with such unflappable understatement that I kept waiting for him to get angry and when he didn't, I came to appreciate his way of letting statistics pack the sting. For instance: "According to a statement of the Chile Copper Corporation in 1971, the four big United States companies who had been exploiting Chile's copper, nitrate and iron resources for 60 years had in that time taken out of Chile wealth to the value of $10.8 billion. 'This figure is of tremendous significance for Chile,' it commented, 'if one compares it with the fact that the gross national product achieved throughout the entire existence of the country, that is, approximately 400 years, amounts to $10.5 billion . . .' "

If MacEoin appears to be building his case with the plodding relentlessness of a lawyer defending a black before a redneck jury, he has his reasons. Allende, a physician and the former dean of the Chilean Senate, was ridiculed by American correspondents as "an acrobat," "a plump little doctor" and "a former country coroner." Even worse, as MacEoin writes, "The Allende victory emerges simply as a happening, not as the culmination of a long and harsh struggle by the workers for recognition."

Just as Nixon's Vietnamization made the killing there nearly invisible, his overthrow by proxy of Allende helped keep the bloody drama off American television. And the American press apparently felt honor bound to follow the game plan. The most notable exception was *Newsweek* correspondent John Barnes' report shortly after the coup, from the Santiago morgue: ". . . Most had been shot at close range under the chin. Some had been machine-gunned in the body . . . They were all young and, judging from the roughness of their hands, all from the working class. A couple of them were girls, distinguishable among the massed bodies only by the curves of their breasts. Most of their heads had been crushed . . ."

How did American editors react? Assign reporters to investigate the killing of 10,000 to 20,000 Allende supporters? No. Investigate the roles of Kissinger and the C.I.A.? No. Instead, several publications assigned reporters to investigate Barnes! *The Wall Street Journal* even gave space to a member of the Chilean oligarchy named Pablo Huneeus to write that Barnes had exaggerated the number of bodies he saw in the Santiago morgue. Like the My Lai massacre, Americans just wanted it to vanish.

Americans may be even less inclined to read MacEoin: ". . . this country with seven per cent of the world's population is able to consume nearly half of the world's production only because the United States government and big business use their power to siphon off an unconscionable part of the wealth produced in poor countries like Chile." Americans may not want to read this superb book. But I hope they do.

The junta's contortion of one of Latin America's few democracies is analyzed in *Chile: Under Military Rule*, a valuable compilation of 60 articles published by IDOC/North America, a nonprofit educational and religious organization. This dossier documents the junta's abolition of civil liberties, its torture and repression, and the revived (after Allende's overthrow) aid gushing from Washington.

One can flip from declarations by Chilean leftists, both underground and exiled, to an interview with the junta's ambassador to Washington, Walter Heitmann (who explains, "It is not a military dictatorship, it is a military government . . . some of the liberties are limited or restricted right now because that is necessary for the recovery of the country."). Or turn to an article by Marlise Simons, a courageous and brilliant free-lance correspondent, revealing the machinations of right-wing businessmen and government officials in Brazil, America's regional surrogate sheriff, in financing the coup and setting up a police state. Among the analyses is a description by Richard J. Barnet, a member of the research-orientated Transnational Institute, of Kissinger's cynical assumption that a Pax Americana—with all the economic exploitation and military repression it implies—will be tolerated by a world desperate for any kind of peace.

The Latin American Revolution, according to its dust jacket, provides "the first comprehensive treatment of the history, politics, and strategy of contemporary revolutionary movements in Latin America." This it does, fortified by Donald C. Hodges' gathering of numerous outlawed documents and his interviews with underground revolutionary leaders in ten countries. Hodges, a professor at Florida State University, offers scholars an arsenal of new information, augmented by an index and a 16-page bibliography, on the rapidly evolving ideology and insurrections of the region's Prufrockian Communists, hesitant Socialists, schismatic Trotskyites, calculating Fidelists and daredevil Guevarists.

However, I cannot—as the dust jacket does—recommend this book to the general reader. Hodges, in displaying a dazzling knowledge of his terrain, presupposes a knowledge of Marxist theory and Latin America. Even specialists will find Hodges' peregrination obstructed by:

a) clichés ("The time is now ripe for . . ."; ". .. a noose around the neck of . . ."; ". . . the Latin American goose that lays golden eggs."; etc.);

b) abbreviations (one six-page romp encounters: CP, FAR, MIR, PGT, POR, FALN, FLA-FALN, MR-13, ELN, Che's original ELN, the revived ELN, Bolivian ELN, Colombian ELN, etc.); and

c) jargon (". . . to liberate themselves from imperialist domination . . ."; ". . . an anti-imperialist and democratic state managed by a populist coalition in the form of a unitary party of the three principal classes . . ."; ". . . under Comintern discipline and controlled from abroad by persons unfamiliar with

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the complex problems and realities of Indo-America."; etc.).

While acknowledging the failure of both Allende's peaceful quest for socialist revolution and numerous rural and urban guerrilla movements during this decade, Hodges concludes that these revolutionaries were simply dramatic ripples in the inevitably seaward movement of a Latin American river of revolution.

Models of the Church

AVERY DULLES, S.J.

Doubleday, $5.95

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

Just as books have their special destinies, so various Christian doctrines seem to have their special times —the Trinity in the fourth century, sin and grace in the fifth, justification in the sixteenth, and so on. The doctrine of the Church has come into its own during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As a result there has been a welter of books on ecclesiology during the past century and a half, with a quantum leap since the Second Vatican Council. In *Models of the Church* Avery Dulles has provided an analysis and a schema that seeks to sort out the principal options in the doctrine of the Church, evaluating each in relation to the others as well as in relation to Scripture and the Christian tradition.

The five alternative models in Father Dulles' taxonomy are: the Church as institution, the Church as community, the Church as sacrament, the Church as herald, and the Church as servant. In the first of these, "the Church tends to become a *total* institution—one that exists for its own sake and serves others only by aggrandizing itself." As a communion, according to Jerôme Hamer as quoted by Dulles, the Church "is at once inward and external, an inner communion of spiritual life (of faith, hope, and charity) signified and engendered by an external communion in profession of the faith, discipline and the sacramental life." The Church is seen as sacrament when "the actions of the Church as such whereby men are bound together in grace by a visible expression" are taken to be constitutive of its nature. An ecclesiology that identifies the Church as herald "sees the Church as gathered and formed by the word of God" and regards it as the mission of the Church "to proclaim that which it has heard, believed, and been commissioned to proclaim." Finally, the Church as servant, in the formulation of the late Cardinal Cushing as quoted by Dulles, "announces the coming of the kingdom not only in word, through preaching and proclamation, but more particularly in work, in her ministry of reconciliation, of binding up wounds, of suffering service, of healing."

As often happens to scholars who summarize the thoughts of many others, the author does "not feel compelled to choose" unambiguously from among the options, but prefers to be somewhat eclectic in his own stance. Believing strongly "that to immure oneself behind a fixed theological position is humanly and spiritually disastrous" and that "none of these approaches is invalid, none superfluous, and none by itself sufficient," he takes it as his assignment to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each position. Therefore he does not want "to polemicize from a standpoint within his own preferred position." Despite his caution, however, he does sometimes seem to be polemicizing against the institutional model in just that way. It is the only one of the five that "cannot properly be taken as primary." When Father Dulles characterizes the institutional model as teaching that "the Church is a kind of cable car or sacred chariot that takes men to their destination," in which "each individual [is] equipped with his own pair of opera glasses" and can ignore his fellows, he comes dangerously close to caricature, as he does when he blames the institutional preoccupation of seventeenth-century theology on "the baroque mentality." On the other hand, when, near the end of the book, the author acknowledges that "for blending the values in the various models, the sacramental type of ecclesiology in my opinion has special merit," it should not come as a surprise to the reader. For despite his thrice-repeated warning against the "aestheticism" that so easily besets the sacramental model, he has been arguing all along in a way that would seem to incline him toward making the Eucharist, rather than organization or fellowship or sermon or social service, define what the Church is and does.

Let me begin my brief critical remarks by asserting that I share this preference for the model of the Church as sacrament. For that very reason I find it strange that Father Dulles has given such scanty attention to Eastern Orthodox ecclesiology, to which he refers only *en passant* as he compares various Western theories, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. The doctrine of the Church set forth in Aleksei Khomiakov's *The Church Is One*, or for that matter the one propounded by Vladimir Soloviev, would seem to have much to offer, since it does bring together many of the strands that have tended to be separated in Western theology. It also manages to avoid the snobbery into which several of the models described here seem to be in danger of leading. When, in the model of the Church as servant, those who march for justice "sometimes feel closer to one another" across confessional lines than to the uninvolved Christians in the pew, it is appropriate to ask, as the author does, "whether the Church would have a message of

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REVIEWERS

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comfort for someone who, through no fault of his own, was dying poor and friendless" or for "the old woman in the garden" of whom St. Thomas used to speak. Foxhole conversions and deathbed theology certainly bear within themselves enormous possibilities for corruption, but any doctrine of the Church that does not include the ministry to the needs of individuals is not worth very much; nor, come to think of it, is it very "sacramental."

As one who deals primarily with doctrinal questions that have now become historical questions, I shall reserve for a personal conversation with Avery Dulles an exploration of what he means when he says, speaking of early Christian eschatology, that "this again is a historical question, and the answer to it tells us nothing about the doctrinal question." But meanwhile I am pleased to commend *Models of the Church* as a monograph that gives us, in remarkably brief compass, an introduction to a vast literature and to a complex set of issues, and does so with fairness, clarity, and grace.

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Abigail McCarthy (Cont.)

man words reflecting conquest in English history—*swine* in the sty and *pork* on the table, *deer* in the forest and *venison* at the feast—as well as a Latinate legal vocabulary and mystery-evoking words of Celtic origins thus a testimony to the multiple sources of the people we call English. The Slavs are many peoples who share a common source for their languages. (The Bohemians who settled on farms in the Midwest had no thought of common origin with the Jugoslavs who came to this country to work in the mines, for example—at least in the immigrant generation.) Many ethnic groups were already modified by a common history before they came to the United States. They were "hyphenated" in the countries from which they came—like the Serbo-Croatians, the German-Russians of the Ukraine, French-Swiss and German-Swiss, French-Canadians. Even many of the Irish who first came to Minnesota after a generation or two in Canada, like my great-grandfather, who was born in Halifax, were more properly Irish-Canadian, I suppose.

For most white Americans today outside of certain urban enclaves ethnic identification is a matter of choice. Father Andrew Greeley is quoted as saying in a speech in Chicago (November 20, 1974) that "ethnicity is an option, not an obligation. If you want to be ethnic, you have a choice of ways: moderate, or marginal, disaffected or core ethnic." For ethnicity has a way of suddenly melting away. Because, for example, as my great-grandparents and grandparents were immigrants of Irish origin over a century ago I have always thought of myself as Irish-American as did my parents and proudly so. But my children are part-German; I have blood cousins of Swedish, French (and probably American Indian), English, Polish, and Italian background; my children have cousins of Egyptian and Russian-

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Jewish ancestry. I cannot be anything but moderate or marginal in my ethnicity without denying or denigrating people with whom I share a physical heritage. This must be true of millions of Americans.

It is perhaps in recognition of this fact that Father Geno Baroni, who had dedicated himself to urban ethnics, said in a recent statement that it was necessary for all Americans to be sure of their identities and gave President Lyndon Johnson as an example of one who was sure of, and who constantly affirmed, his identity—thus equating regional roots with ethnic ones. Lyndon Johnson's identity, like that of his German-American neighbors on the Pedernales, was Texan—a matter of place and environment, "the environment of which he forms a natural part," in Simone Weil's words.

Differentiation is necessary to our well-being. "Unlikeness is a way of participating in society" (Greeley). Diversity implies a certain strength in a society; it makes for an interesting, multi-faceted people and for creative tension among them. But as we approach the Bicentennial in need of spiritual regeneration how can we find our common roots—that natural participation in the life of a community of Americans "which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain particular expectations for the future"?

(to be continued)

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CORRESPONDENCE

(*Continued from page 67*)

only language our society seems to understand. There has been violence and bloodshed and destruction in South Boston, yet no one, including Mr. Cort, is able to look at this activity not simply as racism, but as something deeper. It is, in fact, the cry of a ghetto of a different sort pleading in the language of violence, the only language America understands, for the right to shape their own destinies as human beings and to hold on tightly to what little opportunity to pursue happiness our class society has allowed them.

There is racism in both South Boston and Roxbury and it is ugly to be sure. But perhaps we should stop merely condemning South Boston and recognize, as we did with the Blacks in the sixties, that their outrage is symptomatic of our society's failure to fulfill the promise to all Americans of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And maybe the Blacks and Whites of Boston will start to realize that their problems do not begin and end with a busride to school or the color of a person's skin, but are embedded in a society which discriminates against the poor and lower-middle-classes because oppression is a fundamental element of the industrial corporate state. And maybe if the Christians among us could be true to their founder for a time, they would stop condemning and might understand and forgive and see themselves in their Southie brethren. Then, it would become impossible to label the busing problems as racism or prejudice, and we might begin to glimpse the complexities of the issue which have eluded us so far.

MICHAEL C. O'NEILL

Reply

Mr. O'Neill makes some good points. And the really chic sociology is on his side. Robert Coles made similar points in a full-page piece in the *Boston Globe* last October.

I shall try not to condescend, Mr. O'Neill, but look you straight in the eye and give you one of the least chic of all clichés: two wrongs don't make a right. This class oppression bit has some validity, but as you and others have used it the argument becomes a cop-out and an evasion of the fundamental issue.

If you are trying to say, and you seem to be, that in the city of Boston the Irish are as oppressed as the blacks, then you had better come back to Boston and take a second look. You don't know Boston—South, North, East or West.

Leaders of the black community answered Dr. Coles and they answer

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you. The difference between the oppression of poor Irish and the oppression of poor blacks is not simply a difference in degree but a difference in kind, because the latter is compounded and intensified by another factor, the racism of rich and poor Irish, rich and poor WASP, rich and poor what-have-you.

Class oppression is a serious evil and its elimination will certainly make easier the elimination of racism, but that is a long-range process as things look now and blacks should not be asked to wait for its completion. Meanwhile, there is a very simple little something that everyone, rich and poor, can do to relieve a major part of the oppression of black people, and that is simply to look upon them and treat them as human beings like our own beautiful white selves. And they are not doing that in South Boston, Mr. O'Neill, nor in most of the rest of America.

There are other languages beside violence that all elements in our society still understand, and among them are the languages of human respect, and disrespect. I heard those languages loud and clear in South Boston.

JOHN C. CORT

Ill-Defined Concepts

Bronx, N.Y.

To the Editors: Although I usually enjoy Mark Taylor's work in *Commonweal,* I am disappointed by his first "regular literary column" [McHale's Retreat," Mar. 14]. All readers and critics, consciously or not, carry with them expectations from or norms of value for a literary text. Taylor's are clear in at least two places. *Alinsky's Diamond,* he writes, "would be about the mysterious and sudden coalescence of random or disjointed circumstance into *the supreme fact* of terror, of paralyzing, existential fear . . ."; likewise, "what McHale can do *at the top of his form,* as he has shown once, is make you shudder . . ." (italics mine). This emphasis on existential terror and shudder may or may not be useful as a critical rule of thumb. It is certainly off the mark in reading McHale. For whom is terror "the supreme fact"? For McHale? Hardly. In two out of the three novels, and in major sections of *Farragan's Retreat,* McHale tries to develop a comic vision of life or at least of the particular, ethnic materials he works with. Taylor may not want McHale to do this, but he does. Surely in reading novels, one must be especially observant of the old critical saw: do not criticize an author for the book he didn't write.

Comedy is more or less mature and true to experience in its greater or lesser grasp of the anxieties and shudders of life—which it integrates, overcomes, and smiles at. How sure is McHale's grasp here? As Taylor says, not so sure as it might be. Something remains to be integrated perhaps. But do not tell McHale to write sadder books. Encourage his comedy to refine and deepen itself. Taylor's models for McHale (Joyce in "The Dead," Steinbeck in *East of Eden,* Frost in "Desert Places") are perverse. Indeed there are other, obvious works by these same authors that would illuminate McHale's comic vision and, granted, make one wish for more from it.

McHale uses standard *topoi* freely (e.g., the henpecked husband, the eunuch, the picaresque journey), as comic writers frequently do; Taylor usefully points some of these out. I disagree with Taylor's *generic* expectations from McHale; it is beside the point to isolate passages of "existential terror" in a writer working in the genre of the comic novel. Phrases like "Christ figures, of a sort" and "no perceptible metaphoric value" betray a want of thought. They refer the reader to ill-defined contexts, as ill-defined as Taylor's concept of what McHale has been trying to do.

GERARD REEDY, S.J.
Department of English
Fordham University

Reply

Gerard Reedy refers to McHale's "comic vision of life," magisterially insists that McHale is "working in the

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

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

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genre of the comic novel," and brands as "ill-defined" my "concept of what McHale has been trying to do," all by way of taking exception with *my* "generic expectations from McHale." In fact (though naturally I do have "norms of value for a literary text," both conscious and unconscious), I read McHale with no particular expectations, generic or otherwise—still less with an *a priori* notion of what he is trying to do. And I found, I'm sorry, that *Farragan's Retreat* is a superb novel because it makes you shudder, or more precisely, because of the way it makes you shudder (by showing that the merely funny is not *merely* funny), and furthermore, that McHale's other novels are less successful, not because they do other things (of which I would presumably disapprove?), but because they do this same thing, less well. These are the books that McHale wrote, not the ones I wanted him to.

No, an "emphasis on existential terror and shudder" is not my "critical rule of thumb," but I believe that it is exactly such an emphasis that Tom McHale's fiction has so far tried to force, which does make it, with respect to this fiction, a kind of supreme fact. Of course, if Father Reedy wishes to ignore all the characters in McHale's work who anticipate and then die violent deaths (in the passages that I "isolate"), if he persists in believing that he has an inside track on what McHale has been trying to do, and if he allows a predetermined notion of comic decorum to erase or flatten out McHale's best moments, that's his business, but then, please, no more on the generic expectations of others.

MARK TAYLOR

Warring for Oil

Cambridge, Mass.

To the Editors: In his letter to the editors [Feb. 28] Langdon Gilkey provides a succinct statement of the case against the now much-discussed possibility of American military intervention in the Middle East in response to oil price increases. Recent issues of magazines such as *Harper's* and *Commentary* have carried articles setting out in some detail the strategy and tactics for such intervention, and it is a relief to find that there are yet those who would refrain from saber-rattling in a discussion of the issue.

There are, however, serious flaws in Prof. Gilkey's approach to the problem, and a brief discussion of these might serve to point out the intractability of the issues—in particular the moral arguments—which the professor would have us believe are clear-cut.

To begin with, the substance of Prof. Gilkey's position on the moral issue, if I understand it aright, is that there is a distinction to be made between self-defense in the event of overt attack and self-defense in the event of economic strangulation. Military action in the former case would be, in his view, justified. But military response in the latter case, "to steal whatever territories and goods belonging to others we may consider necessary to our survival or even . . . to our well being," —this, he asserts, is morally absurd and self-contradictory. He supports this view by pointing out that the logic of any argument to the contrary would lead to the conclusion that underdeveloped nations, already faced with rising prices for needed agricultural commodities, have a legitimate case for intervention when we suddenly cut off exports.

There are two problems with this, one dealing with substance and the other with application. As to the former, there is the matter of the distinction between military attack and economic strangulation, which raises the thorny issue of a definition for the term aggression in the context of an economically interdependent world. Prof. Gilkey points out that in the case of military intervention by the U.S. in response to economic strangulation, it would be we, and not they, who would instigate the attack. But is the matter all that clear-cut? In the extreme case, enemy troops wielding guns on American shores might not be qualitatively distinct from foreign oil company managers wielding control over costs and

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prices in an American (or world) economy heavily dependent on their oil, or at least heavily dependent on the financial resources having to be expended to obtain that oil.

But granted that such an extreme case has yet to arise, there are yet problems with the application of the moral principle to current realities. To wit, by and large the United States *has not* cut off exports of food supplies needed by underdeveloped nations. Moreover, such price rises as have occurred have been consistent with economic realities of factor costs, shortages of supply, and the consequences of inflation coupled with economic recession. Oil prices, on the other hand, rose from $1.80/bbl in December of 1970 to $11.65/bbl in October of 1973—an increase arising from economic considerations to be sure (e.g., resource depletion), but from political and ideological ones as well.

With the problem stated in this form, the specter which arises is not that of the United States rattling its sabers in response to a challenge to its luxuries ("our mammoth autos and our unique levels of consumption"), espousing the communal nature of any property we need but do not possess. Rather the specter is the quite tangible one of oil-rich sheiks extracting undigestible, surplus revenues in the sale of unmanufactured commodities. And it is this problem of the application of the moral principle which must be dealt with since, as Paul Seabury pointed out in a recent issue of the *New Leader*, "Protracted deprivation brought about by a transfer of . . . earned wealth (acquired through labor, skill, and intelligence) to those already inordinately rich and becoming more so with each day, who contribute nothing of themselves to what they claim and sell as their own, is not a condition likely to produce either friendship or peace."

In the absence of any clear-cut case of strangulation, or even of an adequate definition of the term, debate on the possible equivalence of military attack and economic strangulation gives way to the matter of these various specters raised by current realities or, more accurately, to the matter of inter-state perceptions, images, and intentions conveyed. In this arena the appeal to purported historical analogies to the cases of mid-century Germany or Japan is destructive.

American leaders cannot and should not accede to the argument that the time has come for the developed countries to share out their ill-gotten gains with the formerly exploited less-developed countries. Such a concession would not only be of dubious wisdom, it would be, in fact, a concession to an argument based on often false premises —an ill-conceived exercise in breast-beating over economic disparities which have arisen, not so much from the nefarious activities of capitalist-imperialists, as from the strengths of certain forms of economic and political organization. Furthermore, then, it is a refusal to make such a concession which Secretary of State Kissinger wishes to convey when he asserts that the United States would contemplate the use of force in the event of strangulation by the oil-producing countries.

Given the absence of a clear-cut case of economic strangulation, and given the various negative consequences of intervention by the United States alone in the absence of such a case (and, in pointing these out Prof. Gilkey is well-taken), what is at issue, then, is the problem of the limits of the right of any state to sovereign control over its resources. I believe we would do well, in this context, to remember Felix Frankfurter's remark to the effect that "my freedom to move my fist is constrained by the proximity of your face." For, particularly in the case of a democratic society, excessive focus on the moral issues of international politics could, in this matter, lead either to an attempted globalistic solution (America as the world's filling station attendant) or to a tit-for-tat policy of responding to third world economic initiatives in kind. Neither alternative seems particularly palatable, but it would seem to be in the interests of the United States to let it be known that the freedom of oil-producing states to move their fists is not unlimited. Should present conditions prevail over an extended period there is a danger of the recrudescence of American globalism and, more possibly, the threat of a new mercantilism.

GEORGE M. CALDWELL
Harvard Divinity School

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

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